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The Comparative Fortunes of the Right to
Health: Two Tales of Justiciability in
Colombia and South Africa
Katharine G. Young* & Julieta Lemaitre**
INTRODUCTION
The legal recognition of the right to health worldwide has never been so
advanced. At least 115 constitutions around the world have entrenched the
right to health or health care,1 whether as justiciable claim-rights, aspira-
tional guarantees, or a combination of the two.2 As of November 2012,
every country except South Sudan is a party to at least one human rights
treaty that addresses the right to health or other health-related rights.3
Often, international obligations lead to policy recommendations and super-
visory measures within the international legal domain, which can affect do-
mestic law and health policy.4 Yet increased levels of mobilization and
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** Associate Professor, Universidad de los Andes Law School, Colombia; LLB (1995) (Universidad
de los Andes), MA (1998) (NYU), SJD (2007) (Harvard). This article has benefited from presentations
to the Right to Health Panel of the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association, Chicago, June
2010; the Social and Economic Rights Reading Group, Harvard Law School, September 2011; and the
South African Reading Group, New York Law School, March 2012. Our thanks to all who were present,
as well as to Thomas Faunce, Everaldo Lamprea, Sandra Liebenberg, Vlad Perju, and Lucie White for
their feedback on earlier versions. The usual caveat applies.
1. Office of the U.N. High Comm’n for Human Rights, The Right to Health: Fact Sheet No. 31 10
(2008), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Factsheet31.pdf.
2. In this article, we adopt the terminology of justiciability to refer to claims that may be brought
by individuals before courts, and aspirational guarantees that direct a government to take certain mea-
sures, which cannot, by themselves, form a cause of action before a court. We note that certain combina-
tions exist, such as the “Directive Principles of State Policy” which form the basis of the right to health
care in India, and yet also form a cause of action because of the link to the right to life. See KATHARINE
G. YOUNG, CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 116–18 (2012).
3. Office of the U.N. High Comm’n for Human Rights, supra note 1, at 1.
4. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No.
14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12 of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR]), ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2004 (Aug. 11, 2000)
(influential statement of government obligations with respect to the right to health under the ICESCR).
These obligations are not justiciable under the ICESCR until a new complaints mechanism becomes
effective. See Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, G.A. Res. 63/117, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/117 (Dec. 10,
2008). The Optional Protocol recently received its tenth ratification and will enter into force on May 5,
2013. State Parties include Argentina, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Mongolia, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, and Uruguay. See Status of Chapter IV, Human Rights, 3.
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litigation have also occurred at the national level with respect to the right
to health provisions entrenched locally.5 For advocates of the right to
health, the path is open to create health systems that are more rights-re-
specting and more just.6
Yet deep uncertainty about the legal operation of the right to health
remains. Opponents argue that its entrenchment leads to an expansion of
judicial power—as well as the introduction of incommensurable individual
and curative claims7—in a necessarily utilitarian policy area. We suggest
two questions to unlock this debate. First, what are the effects of jus-
ticiability on a healthcare system? Second, how do matters of institutional
design change those effects?
In this Article, we examine these questions by comparing the operation
of the right to health in the domestic legal systems of Colombia and South
Africa. Since 1991 in Colombia, and 1996 in South Africa, the right to
health has been entrenched as a justiciable guarantee that moves beyond
mere public health protections.8 Yet the legal impact of the right to health
has followed divergent paths. In Colombia, the right to health has
grounded an elaborate structure of private litigation and a new conscious-
ness of healthcare entitlement. In South Africa, the right to health has sup-
ported limited judicial interventions only in particular health scenarios,
along with some extra-judicial space for negotiating healthcare policy.
We seek to describe and explain these differences through a detailed
study that accounts for legal and constitutional arguments, questions of
institutional design, and the urgency and substance of civil society de-
mands.9 By providing an almost two-decade snapshot of the legal meaning
ICESCR, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
IND&mtdsg_no=IV-3-a&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
5. See generally LITIGATING HEALTH RIGHTS: CAN COURTS BRING MORE JUSTICE TO HEALTH? (Ali-
cia Ely Yamin & Siri Gloppen eds., 2011) [hereinafter LITIGATING HEALTH RIGHTS] (detailing case
studies in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, India, and South Africa). See also, e.g., Colleen M.
Flood, Lance Gable & Lawrence O. Gostin, Introduction: Legislating and Litigating Health Care Rights
Around the World, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 636, 637–38 (2005) (presenting data from New Zealand,
Israel, Canada, South Africa, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States).
6. See generally NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH: MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY (2008) (revising
an earlier work on justice in health care to focus on general questions of health, driven by equality
norms); JENNIFER PRAH RUGER, HEALTH AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (2009) (developing a social justice ac-
count of health reliant on human capability).
7. See, e.g., Jacob Mchangama, International Policy Network, Health as a Human Right: The Wrong
Prescription 3, 12 (2009).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 17 and 22. See also Eleanor D. Kinney & Brian Alexander
Clark, Provisions for Health and Health Care in the Constitutions of the Countries of the World, 37 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 285, 291 (2004) (presenting data that suggests that two thirds of all constitutions contain
provisions protective of health or health care, and noting that more recent constitutions are more likely
to reflect statements of duty and entitlement).
9. We engage in comparative constitutional law to shed light on these questions. For further refer-
ence, see Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225 (1999)
(proposing the various functional, expressive, and bricoleur impulses that guide the comparative en-
deavor); Kim Lane Scheppele, Constitutional Ethnography: An Introduction, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 389
(2004) (highlighting the importance of detailed description in constitutional comparison).
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of the right to health in these two jurisdictions, we integrate an analysis of
text, case law, and societal responses. We pay special attention to the differ-
ent features of judicial review—standing, access, review, and remedies—
that configure the traditional debate about the tension that the jus-
ticiability of human rights (and particularly economic and social rights) is
said to create for democracy. In addition, we raise questions about the back-
ground institutional design of the allocation of healthcare resources. This
allows us to shift the present parameters of the right to health debate,
which focus on either broad ethical questions or narrow institutional ones,
to include multiple variables that shape the right in each scenario.10
Part I of the Article provides an overview of the legal definition of the
right to health and introduces the key institutional features of Colombia’s
and South Africa’s guarantees. In Parts II and III, we characterize the opera-
tion of the right to health as involving forms of justiciability, which we
label either “high-intensity” or “low-intensity,” in Colombia and South
Africa, respectively. In Part IV, we disaggregate the evidence of jus-
ticiability into four variables: doctrinal arrangements (whether they are sup-
portive of content-heavy, core, substantive rights or procedural obligations),
judicial roles (whether they are supportive of access to courts and individual
remedies), private financing arrangements (how profit-seeking incentives
for efficiency and non-health-related interests are arranged), and the con-
figurations of civil society. Far from leading inexorably to the expansion of
judicial power, and to litigious, individualistic, and curative biases in
health systems, the entrenchment of a justiciable right to health can instead
produce only minimal litigation, private negotiations in the shadow of liti-
gation, and civil society pressure for legal change. Our conclusions are im-
portant for further research, as well as for current policy and legal design
around health care and human rights.
I. THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AS A LEGAL RIGHT
The right to health is a relatively new legal concept, borrowed from the
aspirational terms of international human rights instruments and of evolv-
10. For present contributions on the justiciability of the right to health, see, e.g., LITIGATING
HEALTH RIGHTS, supra note 5; Octavio L. M. Ferraz, The Right to Health in the Courts of Brazil: Worsening
Health Inequities?, 11.2 HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 33 (2009); Lisa Forman, Justice and Justiciability:
Advancing Solidarity and Justice Through South Africans’ Right to Health Jurisprudence, 27 MED LAW 661
(2008). Justiciability has become a recent focus of much scholarship on economic and social rights. See,
e.g., COURT AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN NEW DEMOCRACIES (Roberto Gargarella et al. eds.,
2006); COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE: JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE
DEVELOPING WORLD 38 (Varun Gauri & Daniel M. Brinks eds., 2008) [hereinafter COURTING SOCIAL
JUSTICE]. For the Latin American context, see VICTOR ABRAMOVICH & CHRISTIAN COURTIS, LOS DER-
ECHOS SOCIALES COMO DERECHOS EXIGIBLES (2002); Rodolfo Arango, Promocio´n de los derechos sociales
constitucionales por vı´a de proteccio´n judicial, in EL OTRO DERECHO, 103–22 (2002).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLH\26-1\HLH108.txt unknown Seq: 4 22-APR-13 15:45
182 Harvard Human Rights Journal / Vol. 26
ing philosophies of distributive justice.11 International efforts to define the
right to health, and to establish it within a legal framework, have been
long-standing.12 The World Health Organization defines health as “a state
of complete physical and mental well-being.”13 In the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), “the right of
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health”14 is limited only by what States can progressively realize.15
Further interpretations of this obligation have advanced “core obligations”
to include, inter alia, the protection of the social determinants of health, the
provision of “essential” drugs, and equitable access to health care.16
In Colombia, the right to health is constitutionally protected in Article
49 of the Constitution:
Attention to health and environmental sanitation are public ser-
vices [of the] responsibility of the State. The access to services of
promotion, protection and recovery of health are guaranteed to
all persons.
It corresponds to the State to organize, direct and regulate the
provision of health services . . . in accordance with the principles
of efficiency, universality and solidarity. [It corresponds] also [to
the State], to establish policies for the provision of health services
by private entities, and to exercise supervision and control [over
them]. Likewise, to establish the competences of the Nation, the
territorial entities and individuals and to determine the contribu-
tions of [their] responsibility in the terms and conditions speci-
fied in the law.
11. Distributive justice refers to normative principles for the allocation of resources and opportuni-
ties in a given society, and usually adopts egalitarian criteria. This can be contrasted with a conception
of justice as compensatory or desert-based. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 86–89 (1999).
See also DANIELS, supra note 6, at 56–63 (applying Rawls’ equality of opportunity to the health context).
12. The spread of diseases beyond national borders spurred early international efforts to define the
right to health. In 1903, the Office International d’Hygie`ne Publique, which ultimately became the
Health Organization of the League of Nations, began to discuss the concept of primary health care for
all, which was later taken up by the United Nations. A somewhat different focus came from work-
related issues of health, explored by the International Labor Organization, founded in 1919. See Eibe
Riedel, The Human Right to Health: Conceptual Foundations, in HEALTH: A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE,
21, 21–22; JOHN TOBIN, THE RIGHT TO HEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 56–63 (2011). The obliga-
tion created by international treaties to recognize the right to health does not always align with an
obligation on states to provide a judicial remedy. Id. at 207. Often justiciability is restricted only to the
principle of non-discrimination in the provision of health care. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, General
Comment No. 14, supra note 4, at ¶ 1.
13. Constitution of the World Health Organization [WHO] pmbl., July 22, 1946, 62 Stat. 2676,
14 U.N.T.S. 185.
14. ICESCR, supra note 4, at art. 12(1). The right to health care is also found in the Convention on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women [CEDAW], art. 12, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S.
13; the Convention on the Rights of the Child [CRC] art. 24, Nov. 20, 1989, 1249 U.N.T.S. 14; and
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights [Banjul Charter], art. 16, June 27, 1981, 1520
U.N.T.S. 217.
15. ICESCR, supra note 4, at art. 2(1).
16. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, General Comment No. 14, supra note 4, at  ¶¶ 9, 14.
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Health services shall be organized in a decentralized manner, by
level of care and with participation of the community.
The law shall specify the terms under which basic care for all
inhabitants will be gratuitous and obligatory.
Every person has the duty to provide for [procurar] comprehensive
attention to their health and to [that] of their community.17
This provision takes the form of an “institutional guarantee,”18 although, as
we will see in Part II below, it has been converted by the Colombian Con-
stitutional Court (“CCC”) into a subjective and justiciable right.19 The
right is supported by the availability of a tutela action, which allows any
individual to bring an action for their fundamental rights.20 Colombia is
also a party to the ICESCR and to other regional human rights instruments
that protect the right to health care,21 a matter of great relevance given the
CCC’s repeated insistence that international human rights treaties are part
of the Constitution.22
17. CONSTITUCIO´N POLI´TICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 49, amended by Acto Legislativo 2 de 2009
to include a provision on drug abuse as of special concern to the Constitution. L. 2/09, 21 de diciembre
de 2009, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.]. Furthermore, article 50 establishes free health care for all infants
under one year of age whether they are insured or not. CONSTITUCIO´N POLI´TICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.]
arts. 49–50.
18. An institutional guarantee is the guarantee, entrenched in the Constitution, of the existence of
a given institution that cannot be suppressed by legislature. See ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTI-
TUTIONAL RIGHTS 324 (2002).
19. This is based not only on article 49, but also on the constitutional entrenchment of the rights
to life, dignity, and social security, and the reflection that this right includes the right to health.
CONSTITUCIO´N POLI´TICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 49; see generally EVERALDO LAMPREA, LA CONSTITU-
CIO´N DE 1991 Y LA CRISIS DE LA SALUD (2011) (providing an account of the debates on the right to
health in the 1991 Constitutional Assembly).
20. See generally RODOLFO ARANGO & JULIETA LEMAITRE, JURISPRUDENCIA CONSTITUCIONAL
SOBRE EL DERECHO AL MI´NIMO VITAL (2003) [hereinafter ARANGO & LEMAITRE, JURISPRUDENCIA
CONSTITUCIONAL] (describing the role of jurisprudence regarding core minimum rights); see also Julieta
Lemaitre, El Coronel Sı´ Tiene Quien le Escriba: La Proteccio´n Judicial del Derecho al Mı´nimo Vital en Colombia
3–9 (Yale Law School Seminario en Latinoame´rica de Teoria Constitucional y Politica, Paper No. 43),
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yls_sela/43 (last visited Oct. 4, 2012) [hereinafter Lemaitre, El Co-
ronel]. Available in English as Julieta Lemaitre, “Someone Writes to the Colonel: Judicial Protection of
the Right to Survival in Colombia and the State’s Duty to Rescue” (2005). SELA (Seminario en Lati-
noame´rica de Teorı´a Constitucional y Polı´tica) Papers. Paper 42. http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/
yls_sela/42.
21. Organization of American States, Additional Protocol to the American Convention of Human
Rights in the Area of Econ., Cultural, and Soc. Rights, art. 10, Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69.
22. This is known as the doctrine of the “constitutional block” (bloque de constitutionalidad) and has
been developed over numerous decisions that make explicit reference to international human rights
treaties to expand the interpretation of certain rights, or to include new rights in the Constitution. The
CCC developed this concept in the late nineties with a series of decisions regarding international hu-
manitarian law (considered to be included in the constitutional block). See Corte Constitucional [C.C.]
[Constitutional Court], 18 de mayo de 1995, Sentencia C-225/95, available at http://www.corteconsti
tucional.gov.co/relatoria/1995/c-225-95.htm; Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], 4 de
diciembre de 1995, Sentencia C-578/95, available at http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/senado/base
doc/cc_sc_nf/1995/c-578_1995.html; Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], 5 de agosto
de 1997, Sentencia C-358/97, available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/1997/c-358-
97.htm.
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In South Africa, Section 27 of the Constitution protects the right to
heath, alongside other economic and social rights:
27. Health care, food, water and social security
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to–
(a) health care services, including reproductive health
care;
. . .
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the
progressive realization of each of these rights.
(3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatment.23
There are additional, and less qualified, guarantees for the right to health
for children and for those in detention, and the right to an environment
that is not harmful to health.24 While constitutional decision-makers are
required to consider international law in the interpretation of the Constitu-
tion,25 South Africa has signed, but not yet ratified, the ICESCR.26
The textual differences between the two forms of constitutional protec-
tion accompany an entirely different set of institutional arrangements. In
short, we describe the operation of the right to health in Colombia and
South Africa as following contrastingly high and low levels of justiciability.
This has led to very different avenues of legal and political support for the
right to health.
II. HIGH-INTENSITY JUSTICIABILITY: COLOMBIA
Colombia’s right to health was introduced in its 1991 Constitution,
which was adopted after a long period of violence and repression dating
from the mid-1940s to the late-1980s.27 The new Constitution introduced
a new conception of the state—one based on the “social rule of law” (estado
social de derecho), which warrants the justiciability of economic and social
rights in certain circumstances.28 It also established the CCC, which would
23. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 27(3).
24. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 28(1)(c), § 35(2)(e), § 24(a).
25. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 39(b).
26. On South Africa’s status as signatory of the ICESCR, see Status of Chapter IV, Human Rights,
3. ICESCR, supra note 4. The South African Cabinet recently approved ratification. Press Release,
ICESCR Ratification Campaign Driver Group, South Africa to Ratify International Socio-Economic
Rights Covenant (Oct. 12, 2012) (on file with author). South Africa is, however, a party to CEDAW,
CRC, and the Banjul Charter, which do address the right to health. See supra note 14.
27. For the historical context and debates that introduced the right to health in Colombia’s 1991
Constitution, see generally LAMPREA, supra note 19 (providing an account of the debates on the right to
health in the 1991 Constitutional Assembly).
28. The 1991 Colombian Constitution included the term “social rule of law” inspired in the Ger-
man socialrechtstaat tradition, which enshrines as a constitutional principle the normative implications of
the distributional policies of the welfare state. CONSTITUCIO´N POLI´TICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 1. As
in the case of the right to health, these specific circumstances have evolved in the court’s decisions. In
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oversee the actions of the lower courts and would exercise concrete, rather
than merely abstract, review.29 Finally, it limited the procedural barriers of
access to courts with a striking innovation: the tutela action, in which indi-
viduals were able to bring any constitutional claim before any court.30
The Colombian tutela, as enshrined in Article 86 of the 1991 Constitu-
tion, is an action presented before any judge for the immediate protection
of a fundamental human right. While the action was first defined in the
Constitution, Decree 2591 of 1991 and the CCC’s jurisprudence developed
the tutela into an expansive institution in which courts have expanded pow-
ers to make decisions in human rights cases, eliminating all of the con-
straints of standing as well as most procedural limitations that fetter other
systems.31 Any person can bring forth a tutela claiming violations of his or
her fundamental rights, the rights of a larger group (e.g., a neighborhood or
an ethnic group), or the rights of a person in a vulnerable situation (e.g.,
children or the elderly). Any judge is qualified to order the government to
take specific actions to protect the right. Unlike in the amparo action else-
where in Latin America, standing in tutela is very generous, as are courts’
powers. In addition, the procedure includes both strict time limitations for
judges, and sanctions for public officials, including jail for contempt of
court if they fail to comply.32
Tutela actions were initially limited to civil and political rights. Court
precedent expanded it to include some economic and social rights (includ-
ing the right to health) as well as certain rights pertaining to vulnerable
groups (e.g., ethnic minorities, children, and internally displaced persons).33
1992, Sentencia T-406/92 famously made the normative principle of the social rule of law central to
tutela decisions. The case refers to an unfinished, overflowing sewer in the municipality of Cartagena.
The court ordered the municipality to finish the sewer and clean up the damages, holding that there
was an immediate threat to the right to public sanitation, and that it was the court’s duty to interpret
rights in the light of a social rule of law. The incorporation of welfare policies in the very nature of the
State has henceforth implied for the court the State must effectively guarantee certain minimal living
standards, including basic sanitation. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], 5 de junio de
1992, Sentencia T-406/02, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (vol. 2, p. 190). For more cases
and explanations of the importance of the concept, see generally Rodolfo Arango, Experiencia Colombiana
Sobre la Justiciabilidad de los Derechos Econo´micos, Sociales y Culturales, in DERECHOS ECONO´MICOS, SOCIALES
Y CULTURALES (Juan Carlos Contreras, ed., 2005) (analyzing the justiciability of economic, social, and
cultural rights); see also RODOLFO ARANGO, EL CONCEPTO DE DERECHOS SOCIALES FUNDAMENTALES
(2005) (providing an overview of the concept of fundamental social rights).
29. CONSTITUCIO´N POLI´TICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 241.
30. CONSTITUCIO´N POLI´TICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 81.
31. Decreto 2591, 19 de noviembre de 1991, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.]. See generally Lemaitre, El
Coronel, supra note 20.
32. See generally ALLAN BREWER-CARI´AS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
LATIN AMERICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AMPARO PROCEEDINGS (2008) (providing a comparison of
similar procedures in the region).
33. For a helpful English translation of excerpts from the CCC’s health jurisprudence, see Manuel
Jose Cepeda Espinosa, Readings on the Colombian Constitutional Court (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.
utexas.edu/law/colloquium/papers-public/2011-2012/02-13-12_Espinosa_Opinions%20of%20Colombi
an%20Constitutional%20Court_post.pdf. Professor Cepeda Espinosa was Former Justice of the Consti-
tutional Court of Colombia, 2001–2009.
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As a result, tutela actions have been central to a constitutional transforma-
tion that has permeated every sphere of state activity to include the concern
with human rights, and to put courts at the reach of ordinary citizens.
Tutelas have thus produced unprecedented implications for the redistribu-
tion of goods and services in this dramatically unequal society.34
The introduction of tutelas has produced a massive amount of private
litigation in Colombia; between 1999 and 2010 there have been 2,725,361
tutela decisions.35 The annual number of tutelas filed has been continually
increasing.36 A striking proportion of tutelas are directed to the right to
health: in 2008, 41.5% of all tutelas claimed protection for the right to
health.37 In the last two years, approximately one quarter of all tutelas were
related to the right to health.38 Through the use of the tutela, and its sup-
port by the CCC, the right to health has been heavily litigated and now
features a mode of justiciability that we describe as “high-intensity.” Be-
low, we categorize three prominent phases of Colombia’s justiciable right to
health.
A. 1992–2008: The Path to Justiciability
The CCC decided its first right to health cases in 1992. These cases,
which were decided before the 1993 reform of the national health system,
established that the right to health was justiciable through the tutela juris-
diction, provided that several conditions were met. When not met, the
right to health remained a “programmatic” or non-justiciable right.39 Since
then, the CCC’s jurisprudence has focused on limiting and developing these
conditions of justiciability.
34. See generally ARANGO & LEMAITRE, JURISPRUDENCIA CONSTITUCIONAL, supra note 20 (describ-
ing the role of jurisprudence regarding core minimum rights); see also Lemaitre, El Coronel, supra note
20.
35. DEFENSORIA DEL PUEBLO, LA TUTELA Y EL DERECHO A LA SALUD 2010 14 (2011).
36. The numbers stood at 344,468 in 2008; 370,640 in 2009; and 403,380 in 2010. Id.
37. DEFENSORIA DEL PUEBLO, LA TUTELA Y EL DERECHO A LA SALUD 2008 26 (2009). After a peak
of 41%, the percentage diminished by 2010 to 23%, after the creation of administrative mechanisms to
solve patient-insurance company disputes following the CCC’s order to do so in 2008. DEFENSORIA DEL
PUEBLO, LA TUTELA Y EL DERECHO A LA SALUD 2010 15 (2011).
38. The percentages were 27.1% in 2009 and 23.4% in 2010. DEFENSORIA DEL PUEBLO, supra note
37.
39. “Programmatic” refers to the aspirational guarantees mentioned above—also known as the
progressive realization of rights. See supra note 2. See, e.g., Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional
Court], 24 de junio de 1992, Sentencia T-426/92, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (vol. 2, p.
452); Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], 5 de junio de 1992, Sentencia T-406/92,
Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (vol. 2, p. 190); Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional
Court], 2 de octubre de 1992, Sentencia T-548/92, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (vol. 6,
p. 729); Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], 11 de agosto de 1992, Sentencia T-484/92,
Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (vol. 4, p. 234); Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional
Court], 16 de septiembre de 1992, Sentencia T-518/92, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.]
(vol. 5, p. 218); Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], 26 de octubre de 1992, Sentencia
T-571/92, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (vol. 6, p. 880); Corte Constitucional [C.C.]
[Constitutional Court], 16 de diciembre de 1992, Sentencia T-613/92, Gaceta de la Corte Constitu-
cional [G.C.C.] (vol. 7, p. 666).
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Initially, such conditions were satisfied when a clear link was established
between the health claim and a “fundamental right,” especially the rights
to life and dignity.40 The CCC adopted an expansive definition of this con-
nection, including not only a person’s physical life, but also elements neces-
sary to preserve one’s dignity.41 Thus, for example, as early as 1992, the
CCC ordered an eye operation for an indigent man who otherwise would
lose his eyesight, out of concern for protecting the man’s right to life, right
to work, and right to health, and thereby his dignity.42 Later, other deci-
sions expanded the justiciability of the right to health. Most notably, the
CCC determined that the right to health was always justiciable in the case
of subjects of special constitutional protection (sujetos de proteccio´n constitu-
cional especial), such as children, pregnant women, and the elderly.43
In 1993, Law 100 transformed the public health system into one of
mandatory health insurance provided by private and public companies,
combining cross-subsidies among the insured with public financing of
health insurance.44 This law defined the content and responsibility for the
40. CONSTITUCIO´N POLI´TICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] arts. 1, 11.
41. In its well-known 2006 decision on abortion, the CCC sums up its definition of dignity: “En
efecto, ha sostenido esta Corporacio´n que en aquellos casos en los cuales se emplea argumentativamente la dignidad
humana como un criterio relevante para decidir, se entiende que e´sta protege: (i) la autonomı´a o posibilidad de
disen˜ar un plan vital y de determinarse segu´n sus caracterı´sticas (vivir como se quiere), (ii) ciertas condiciones
materiales concretas de existencia (vivir bien), (iii) la intangibilidad de los bienes no patrimoniales, integridad
fı´sica e integridad moral (vivir sin humillaciones).” Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], 10
de mayo de 2006, Sentencia C-355/06 § 8.1, available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relato
ria/2006/c-355-06.htm. [Translation by authors: “In effect, this court has held that in the various cases
where human dignity is a relevant criteria for making a decision, it is understood to protect: (i) auton-
omy or the possibility to make one’s own life plan and self-determination according to its characteristics
(to live as one wishes), (ii) certain concrete material conditions for existence (to live well), (iii) the
intangibility of non-patrimonial goods such as physical and moral integrity (to live without humilia-
tion)”]. For a discussion of the interpretive relation between life and dignity, see generally Katharine G.
Young, The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in Search of Content, 33 YALE J. INT’L L.
113 (2008).
42. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], 23 de septiembre de 1992, Sentencia T-
533/92, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (vol. 5, p. 452).
43. This line of argument starts in 1992 with Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], 3
de junio de 1992, Sentencia T-401/92, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (vol. 2, p. 140), on
mentally disabled persons and the general duty to protect of the State vis-a`-vis people in situations of
“debilidad manifiesta” (evident weakness). In relation to the right to health and its justiciability, the
court has also deemed it is immediately justiciable based on “debilidad manifiesta.” Jurisprudence is
quite extensive on this category. Some landmark cases are: Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional
Court], 20 de mayo de 1998, Sentencia SU-225/98, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (vol. 4,
p. 1031)  (in the case of children); Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], 23 de abril de
1999, Sentencia T-208/99, (in the case of prisoners); Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional
Court], 23 de septiembre de 1992, Sentencia T-533/92, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.]
(vol. 5, p. 452) (in the case of the homeless); Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], 24 de
junio de 1992, Sentencia T-426/92, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (vol. 2, p. 452) (in the
case of the elderly); Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], 28 de enero de 2004, Sentencia
T-025/04, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (vol. 1, p. 353) (in the case of internally displaced
people).
44. Health insurance premiums are a fixed percentage of income, and these premiums go to a
common fund. As a result, those who earn more pay more, effectively subsidizing those who earn less.
Government funds cover those who do not work.
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mandatory health insurance plan, Plan Obligatorio en Salud (“POS”), which
included a scheduled list of benefits.45 The list was established by the gov-
ernment though a national council with the representation of different
health industry participants, including hospital professionals, doctors, and
medical experts. The POS continues to control health care rationing deci-
sions, and is reformed periodically to adapt to epidemiological data and new
services and medicines. The CCC’s departure from the POS has been a con-
siderable point of controversy, as we document below.
Law 100 of 1993 delegated responsibility for dispensing the listed bene-
fits to private healthcare providers, although one public provider remained.
The law opened the way for private health insurance companies, known as
Entidades Promotoras de Salud (“EPS”) to mediate between individuals, the
government, and healthcare providers.46 The law also mandated that every
individual contribute a percentage of his or her salary to buy health insur-
ance from any one of these companies (the so-called contributory regime).
In addition, the system provided for subsidized health insurance for the
poor (the so-called subsidized regime) bought by the government and also
administered by the EPS. The EPS paid healthcare providers for any ex-
penses generated by the people they insured through either regime (con-
tributory or subsidized), as long as the expenses were on the scheduled list.
In turn, the companies received funds from the government as well as from
individual contributions.
As early as 1997, the CCC attempted to limit its jurisprudence on the
right to health and elaborated increasingly complex rules.47 This was a re-
sponse in part to the increase in tutelas during a time of economic crisis, and
in part to the CCC’s developed understanding of the new healthcare
system.48
The CCC’s jurisprudence was tied to the potentials and shortcomings of
the healthcare system designed by Law 100. Justiciability was thus granted
on one of two bases. The first was when the claimant had been improperly
denied the medicines and services included in the scheduled list. In these
cases, the CCC generally accepted the justiciability of the right to health,
45. L. 100/93, 23 de diciembre de 1993, DIARIO OFICIAL, [D.O.] arts. 156(b)–(c), 162.
46. L. 100/93, 23 de diciembre de 1993, DIARIO OFICIAL, [D.O.] arts.  177–84.
47. In 1997 the court limited right to health litigation with SU-111, which insisted that the court
ordered protection had to be exceptional, and that the person had to prove he or she could not cover the
costs. However, that same year, with SU-480, the court insisted that EPS recover costs for court-ordered
medicines and treatments from the government, which might have limited litigation if the government
had expanded the scheduled list. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], 25 de septiembre
de 1997, Sentencia SU-480, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (vol. 9, p. 1077), available at
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/1997/SU480-97.htm. Since it did not, in practice this
decision expanded litigation by removing EPS incentive to avoid court orders. Also, the court hence-
forth did not insist on the SU-111 rule that patients prove they did not have funds to cover the
medicine or treatment. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], 6 de marzo de 1997,
Sentencia SU-111/97, available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/1997/SU111-97.htm.
48. See Alicia Ely Yamin, Oscar Parra-Vera, and Camila Gianella, Colombia: Judicial Protection of the
Right to Health: An Elusive Promise?, in LITIGATING HEALTH RIGHTS, supra note 5.
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especially when there was urgency in receiving the medicine or service.49
The second type of claim was when medicines or services were not included
in the scheduled list, which extended to high-cost illnesses such as HIV/
AIDS, known as the “excluded benefit” cases. In these cases, the CCC de-
cided that the right to health was justiciable when there was a threat to life
or dignity.50 These were the more controversial cases.51 In Colombian com-
mentary, this issue has been framed as the “government by judges” criti-
cism, levied especially by local economists in the 1990s,52 as well as by, in
general terms, legal scholars elsewhere.53
In response to these charges, the CCC established a general rule in Deci-
sion SU-111 in 1997 to limit the further expansion of justiciability but only
on the more controversial “excluded benefit” cases. The rule stated that if the
medicine or service was not on the scheduled list, the right to health re-
quired the State to provide the medicine or service 1) when it was ordered
by a doctor, 2) when it was required to save the person’s life or personal
integrity, 3) only if the person could not afford to pay for the treatment,
and 4) the State could afford to pay for the treatment.54 If the criteria were
satisfied, then the case would be both actionable and remediable, and
judges could order the government to reimburse the EPS for court-ordered
expenses.55 This latter insistence on reimbursement was probably meant to
49. There are literally thousands of these cases. Their presence in the system is analyzed in decision
T-760/08. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], 31 de julio de 2008, Sentencia T-760/
08, available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2008/t-760-08.htm.
50. For some early cases, see, e.g., Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], 25 de
diciembre de 1993, Sentencia T-597/93, available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/
1993/t-597-93.htm (ordering orthopedic treatment for a disabled child recovering from surgery—the
treatment was not included); Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], 23 de junio de 1995,
Sentencia T-271/95, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (vol. 6, p. 788) (ordering HIV medica-
tion which was then not in the scheduled list); Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], 1 de
diciembre de 1995, Sentencia T-571/95, available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/
1995/T-571-95.htm (ordering a surgery for a child not included in the list). Of these initial cases, the
HIV cases were the first to spark some activism, as news of the granting of the tutela traveled within the
community of people affected by the disease. Interview by Julieta Lemaitre with Ne´stor Alvarez, Leader,
Asociacio´n de Usuarios Nueva EPS (Association of New EPS Users), in Bogota´, Colombia (Nov. 26,
2011).
51. Mauricio Garcı´a, Derechos sociales y necesidades polı´ticas, in EL CALEIDOSCOPIO DE LAS JUSTICIAS
EN COLOMBIA 455 (Mauricio Garcı´a and Boaventura de Sousa Santos eds., 2001); Rodrigo Uprimny,
Constitucio´n de 1991, Estado Social de Derecho y Derechos Humanos: Promesas Incumplidas, Diagno´sticos y
Perspectivas, in EL DEBATE A LA CONSTITUCIO´N, (Victor Moncayo et al. eds., 2002). For a different point
of view, see ARANGO & LEMAITRE, JURISPRUDENCIA CONSTITUCIONAL, supra note 20.
52. For an authoritative summary of the economists’ criticism of the Constitutional Court, see
Salomo´n Kalmanovitz, Constitucio´n y Modelo Econo´mico, in EL DEBATE A LA CONSTITUCION, supra note 51.
53. See, e.g., RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY (2004); THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL
POWER (C. Neal Tate & Torbjo¨rn Vallinder eds., 1995).
54. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], 6 de marzo de 1997, Sentencia SU-111/97,
available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/1997/SU111-97.htm.
55. Id. The government used the Fondo de Solidaridad y Garantı´a del Sistema General de Seguridad en
Salud (“FOSYGA”) (Solidarity and Guarantee Fund of the General Health Social Security System) for
this type of reimbursement. FOSYGA was created by Law 100 of 1993 (art. 218) and actually set up
three years later through Decree 1283, July 23, 1996. It did not, however, contemplate compensation
for non-POS court-ordered expenses. These were later included through the Ministry of Health’s Reso-
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give the government an incentive to expand the coverage of the POS, but it
had perverse effects, as we shall show.56
In fact, this reimbursement rule opened the door to massive corruption
and mismanagement in the healthcare system. The restrictive rule adopted
in SU-111 disappeared from subsequent cases, especially after 1998, when
the court adopted Decision SU-480. The reimbursement rule, however, re-
mained in place. Because the government did not expand the POS, reim-
bursement benefitted the EPS (whose doctors ordered new services and
medicines not on the list), pharmaceutical companies (which pushed for
their own products in place of cheaper generics), and corrupt public officials
and judges (who funneled money from the reimbursement system into their
private pockets).57
The litigation profiles of the tutela actions reveal the unintended conse-
quences of the CCC-devised rules: litigation for benefits included in the
scheduled list by patients in the contributory regime became the major type
of litigation, followed by litigation for excluded benefits.58 Part of the rea-
son for this lay in the dearth of administrative mechanisms to resolve con-
flicts between patients and insurance companies, leading to a massive use of
the courts. However, it was also the result of attempts by EPS to get addi-
tional compensation for providing services and medicines that were already
in the scheduled list by getting courts to order them. Additionally, this
mechanism created an inadvertent litigation bias in favor of the middle
class, as these patients were more adept at using the legal system.59
In 2003, the CCC attempted to clarify its concept of the right to health,
entrenching a “minimum core” approach specifying under which specific
circumstances there is a threat to the justiciable core of the right.60 This
lution 02312 of 1998 and required EPS to have technical committees that approved the medication or
treatment, rather than allow the courts to oversee the granting of non-POS treatments and medications.
The process was further regulated by Law 1122 of 2007.
56. Because the system is designed so that each EPS receives a fixed amount for each person in-
sured, see L. 100/93, art. 156(f), 23 de diciembre de 1993, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], CCC could have
speculated that it was in the government’s interest to include new treatments and medicines in the
scheduled list of benefits. This, however, was easier said than done for reasons that remain obscure.
57. For a recent document uncovering unscrupulous pricing that resulted in having the state over-
pay some medications, see JUAN GONZALO ZAPATA ET AL., FEDESARROLO, PERTINENCIA DE INCEN-
TIVAR LA COMPETENCIA EN EL MERCADO DE MEDICAMIENTOS BIOTECNOLO´GICOS EN COLOMBIA Y SU
IMPACTO SOBRE LAS FINANZAS DEL SECTOR DE LA SALUD (2012).
58. For a numerical analysis of this trend, see DEFENSORIA DEL PUEBLO, LA TUTELA Y EL DERECHO
A LA SALUD 2009 (2010); DEFENSORIA DEL PUEBLO, LA TUTELA Y EL DERECHO A LA SALUD 2010
(2011); DEFENSORIA DEL PUEBLO, LA TUTELA Y EL DERECHO A LA SALUD 2011: 20 AN˜OS DE USO
EFECTIVO DE LA TUTELA 1992–2011 104 (2012).
59. See Octavio Luiz Motta Ferraz, Harming the Poor through Social Rights Litigation: Lessons from
Brazil, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1643, 1661 (2011). See also David Landau, The Reality of Social Rights Enforce-
ment, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 402, 441 (2012) (applying this to Colombia).
60. See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court] 17 de marzo de 2003, Sentencia T-227/
03, available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2003/T-227-03.htm; Corte Constitu-
cional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court] 25 de septiembre de 2003, Sentencia T-859/03, available at http://
www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2003/T-859-03.htm (developing when the right to health is
justiciable).
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decision brought a new clarity to the right to health, which, due to the
high volume of complaints, had not always been consistent. However, it did
not address the real issues that were increasingly veering the healthcare
system toward a major financial crisis.
B. Decision T-760: Court-Ordered Transformation
In 2008, the CCC’s focus on clarifying justiciability shifted to addressing
the healthcare system’s overwhelming financial problems more directly.
While previous right to health cases often had policy implications that af-
fected the system as a whole, Decision T-760 in 2008 was the first decision
to adopt structural litigation guidelines to specifically order the govern-
ment to address the major problems in the healthcare system.61 The court
ordered the government to revise the scheduled list of benefits, both to
include those that were consistently ordered by courts through tutelas, and
to eliminate persistent disparities between the contributive and the subsi-
dized regimes. In addition, the court asked the government to design non-
judicial mechanisms to resolve disputes between patients and healthcare
providers, and create effective mechanisms to reduce both the promotion of
litigation and the denial of services and information by the EPS.62
Further issues of mismanagement made the healthcare system untena-
ble.63 The government faced increasing delays in actually making reim-
bursements, which the EPS often pointed to in justifying the delay of their
own payments to hospitals and other healthcare facilities. This contributed
to the bankruptcy of many hospitals, especially public hospitals that served
the poor. Complex government-designed procedures for filing claims and
suspect financial decisions (such as the use of healthcare funds to buy gov-
ernment debt bonds, which have long periods before they can be cashed in)
also led to delays in reimbursements. Lastly, the government increased the
61. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], 22 de enero de 2007, Sentencia T-016/07,
available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2007/T-016-07.htm; Corte Constitucional
[C.C.] [Constitutional Court], 31 de julio de 2008, Sentencia T-760/08, available at http://www.
corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2008/T-760-08.htm.
62. Since 2009 the administrative agency in charge of overseeing EPS, the Superintendencia de Indus-
tria y Comercio (henceforth Superintendencia), opened an investigation against the fifteen national EPS and
their national association, ACEMI, for denying services in the scheduled list. Resolution 10958/09 of
the Superintendencia claims that ACEMI worked to unify information and practices among the different
EPS and agreed to deny certain services to keep their profit levels high, also denying the government
information that would lead to the inclusion of certain medicines and services in the scheduled list in
order to keep receiving reimbursements for their provision. Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio
Resolucio´n 10958/09, 6 de marzo de 2009, available at http://www.sic.gov.co/siyc/memoria/resolucion/
superindustria/2009/resolucion_superindustria_10958_2009.html; Con los 63 millones de do´lares se
hicieron pole´micas propuestas para la salud, SEMANA.COM (Feb. 22, 2010), http://www.semana.com/salud—
seguridad-social/63-millones-dolares-hicieron-polemicas-propuestas-para-salud/135225-3.aspx.
63. For a sampling of media coverage of the healthcare crisis, see, e.g., Leonardo Can˜o´n, Juan Carlos
Corte´s & Emilio Cassasco, Un debate postergado, EL ESPECTADOR, Feb. 8, 2010, http://www.elespec
tador.com/impreso/articuloimpreso186415-un-debate-postergado; Cartilla para entender el lı´o de la salud,
SEMANA.COM (Feb. 6, 2010), http://www.semana.com/nacion/cartilla-para-entender-lio-salud/134674-
3.aspx.
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number of people insured through the subsidized regime while the number
insured in the contributory regime did not increase proportionally, threat-
ening the long-term sustainability of the system.
The combination of the justiciability of the right to health, the privatiza-
tion of healthcare insurance through profit-seeking EPS, and government
mismanagement resulted in a system that incentivized increasing govern-
ment expenditures, which were not always reflected in improved healthcare
provision. What was perhaps even more worrisome was the lack of growth
in preventive healthcare services (reflected also in rising costs in services for
preventable illnesses).
Decision T-760 ordered the government to address the many shortcom-
ings of the healthcare system.64 However, the decision coincided with a
significant increase in right to health cases and with further instability of
the health insurance system.65 By the end of the year, it was clear the sys-
tem needed major reform. The CCC, following its own structural litigation
system, monitored the orders with a series of follow-up awards as an at-
tempt to pressure the government into adopting reforms, especially in-
creased regulation.66 Nonetheless, the CCC’s efforts were overshadowed by
the public protest that characterizes the third phase of the impact of the
right to health in Colombia.
C. 2009–2010: Protest and Crisis
The third stage in Colombia’s right to health trajectory was marked by
protest and crisis. In response to Decision T-760, the government adopted
ten decrees that reformed the health system in January 2010.67 The decrees
64. See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], 31 de julio de 2008, Sentencia T-760/
08 available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2008/t-760-08.htm. Former Justice Ma-
nuel Jose´ Cepeda-Espinosa, who authored (and orchestrated the public hearings behind) Decision T-
760, has commended the order’s deliberate focus on “financial sustainability,” and the need to equalize
benefits to protect the poor. Manuel Jose´ Cepeda-Espinosa, Transcript: Social and Economic Rights and the
Colombian Constitutional Court, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1699, 1701–02 (2011).
65. DEFENSORIA DEL PUEBLO, LA TUTELA Y EL DERECHO A LA SALUD 2010 93 (2011).
66. The Constitutional Court has adopted a large amount of follow-up awards, to the point where it
has appointed a special chamber within the court (an assistant judge, working with a group of clerks,
and solely devoted to health issues) to oversee the awards. Some of the awards pressured the government
into adopting reforms before January 2010. For example, on January 26, 2009, the court asked the
government to produce a report showing how they were implementing decision T-706/08. Earlier in
the year, the court created a special “follow-up” group of experts, which produced reports that were
then sent to the government. See Seguimiento al Cumplimiento de la Sentencia T-760 de 2008, CORTE
CONSTITUCIONAL SALA ESPECIAL DE SEGUIMIENTO, available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/
inicio/SEGUIMIENTO%20EN%20SALUD/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2012). The court has a special web-
site for the numerous follow-up awards. For the list of specific awards including those that examine
whether or not the government has complied, see Autos Proferidos por la Sala Especial de Seguimiento,
CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL, http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/inicio/SEGUIMIENTO%20EN%20
SALUD/AUTOS%20ESPECIFICOS%20PROFERIDOS%20POR%20LA%20SALA%20ESPECIAL.
php (last visited Oct. 14, 2012).
67. The decrees adopted were Decreto 126, 21 de enero de 2010, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (estab-
lishing disciplinary and criminal sanctions for fraud in the healthcare system, as well as increasing
government powers to intervene EPS, fine them, control their expenses, and monitor prices paid for
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did not comply with CCC doctrine, however. Instead, they focused on deal-
ing with the budget crisis by limiting services and funneling tax revenues
into the system, including new taxes on alcohol and lotteries. The decrees
proved to be highly controversial, especially the measure that limited ser-
vices not on the scheduled list to resource availability. The decrees also
limited doctors’ ability to order services and medicines, curtailing patients’
access to specialists and fining doctors for ordering medicines and services
not on the scheduled list. Finally, the decrees allowed EPS and hospitals to
use external (and non-unionized) providers of health services and diagnostic
exams.
Surprisingly, given the relative marginality of the right to health in a
country with serious problems with violence, and (at that time) a very pop-
ular government, the decrees gave rise to an unexpected level of protest.68
Many of the protests, framed as a defense of the right to health, specifically
addressed medicines and services (especially coverage of high-cost illnesses)
that the CCC had identified as being covered by a justiciable right to
health.69 Part of the resistance was foreseeable: the measures were a clear
threat to patients with high-cost illnesses. These patients (especially those
medications); Decreto 127, 21 de enero de 2010, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (increasing taxes for alcohol
and cigarettes and funneling them to cover healthcare expenses); Decreto 128, 21 de enero de 2010,
DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (establishing mechanisms for patients to finance their own extra-POS benefits,
including dipping into mandatory savings for housing and education); Decreto 129, 21 de enero de
2010, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (creating new sanctions and fines for those who evade paying mandatory
health insurance even though they can); Decreto 130, 21 de enero de 2010, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.]
(creating new taxes on gambling and lotteries to fund health care); Decreto 131, 21 de enero de 2010,
DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (creating a national technical system to mediate patient-EPS conflicts and ex-
plicitly limit healthcare services to financial availability); Decretos 132 and 133, 21 de enero de 2010,
DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (funneling new resources from the general budget to health care); Decreto 134,
21 de enero de 2010, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (increasing budget for health care in the national budget);
Decreto 135, 21 de enero de 2010, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (directing funds from the law enforcement
budget to the prevention and treatment of drug addiction). To these initial ten decrees, adopted in
January, the government added in February Decreto 358, 4 de febrero de 2010, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.]
(sanctioning doctors that create unnecessary expenses for the healthcare system) and Decreto 398, 5 de
febrero de 2010, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (insisting that access to health care is guaranteed during the
transition to the new system).
68. Interview by Julieta Lemaitre with Ne´stor Alvarez, supra note 50; Interview by Julieta Lemaitre
with Alicia Taffur, Leader, Asociacio´n de Pacientes del Instituto Nacional de Cancerologı´a (Association
of Patients of the National Cancer Institute), in Bogota´, Colombia (Nov. 29, 2011); Interview by Julieta
Lemaitre with Everaldo Lamprea, former Clerk, CCC, involved with the follow-up awards, in Bogota´,
Colombia (Nov. 7, 2011); Observations by Julieta Lemaitre during a public march in Bogota´, Colombia
(Feb. 18, 2010) and a protest before the court in Bogota´, Colombia (Feb. 18, 2010). For the media
coverage, see supra note 63.
69. For press coverage of the marches, see, e.g., Ciudades marchan en contra de los decretos de emergencia
social, SEMANA.COM (Feb. 6, 2010), http://www.semana.com/nacion/ciudades-marchan-contra-decretos-
emergencia-social/134643-3.aspx; Enfermos presentaron 42 demandas ante la Corte, EL TIEMPO, Feb. 17,
2010, http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-3842436; Marchan contra decretos de salud im-
plantados en Colombia, SEMANA.COM (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.semana.com/nacion/marchan-contra-
decretos-salud-implantados-colombia/135146-3.aspx; Pacientes, centrales obreras y hospitales marchara´n este
jueves contra la Emergencia, EL TIEMPO, Feb. 17, 2010, http://m.eltiempo.com/vidadehoy/pacientes-
centrales-obreras-y-hospitales-marcharan-manana-contra-la-emergencia/7235227/home; Protestas en el
paı´s por los decretos de emergencia social, EL TIEMPO, Feb. 6, 2010, http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/
documento/MAM-3828102.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLH\26-1\HLH108.txt unknown Seq: 16 22-APR-13 15:45
194 Harvard Human Rights Journal / Vol. 26
with HIV/AIDS, cancer, or transplant needs) and their supporters formed a
vocal network of grassroots activists and patients’ rights organizations.70
Less foreseeable was the outrage of doctors and medical students who re-
sented government interference with their medical autonomy to decide on
the best course of action—an autonomy the courts had defended.71 This
resentment fed on older grievances with EPS-mandated time limits for con-
sultations, diagnostic exams, and even salaries. Health sector workers, in-
cluding nurses and paramedic associations, perceived the decrees as an
attack on their unions. They were supported by national workers’ unions
and by organizations that generally rejected the privatization of healthcare
services. Finally, the measures also offended middle class contributors to
health insurance, whose benefits were significantly curtailed.
The decrees generated numerous marches and protests accompanied by
sustained pressure to force the government to back down on what the na-
tional media widely claimed was regressive health reform. This put sub-
stantial pressure on the Uribe government leading up to the 2010 election,
in which President Uribe was running for a second term. The EPS were the
only major interest group to support the decrees.72
The government responded by insisting on the need for substantial re-
form, as well as by arguing that special interests fueled opposition to the
reform.73 According to the government, the goals of the decrees were to 1)
limit non-POS expenses to life-threatening illnesses and to people who have
no other means to pay, and 2) increase tax revenue to pay for the health
system. The National Planning Department increased control over the
EPS.74 The government insisted in its website that there were many mis-
70. For an interview with the movement leaders, see Pablo Correa and Carolina Gutie´rrez, Los
Escuderos de los Pacientes, EL ESPECTADOR, Feb. 17, 2010, http://www.elespectador.com/impreso/vivir/
articuloimpreso188384-los-escuderos-de-los-pacientes?q=impreso/vivir/articuloimpreso188384-los-es-
cuderos-de-los-pacientes.
71. For examples of criticism from the medical front, see, e.g., Pablo Correa, Me´dicos temerosos a la
hora de formular, EL ESPECTADOR, Feb. 4, 2010, http://www.elespectador.com/impreso/negocios/articulo
impreso185962-medicos-temerosos-hora-de-formular; Me´dicos dicen que son “aberrantes” los decretos de la
emergencia social, SEMANA.COM (Feb. 1, 2010), http://m.semana.com/problemas-sociales/medicos-dicen-
aberrantes-decretos-emergencia-social/134430-3.aspx; Se agudiza pole´mica con me´dicos por decretos que
reforman la salud, EL TIEMPO, Feb. 3, 2010, http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-
3821976.
72. E´dmer Tovar, Decretos de emergencia social se quedaron corto: Juan Manuel Dı´az Granados presidente de
ACEMI, EL TIEMPO, Jan. 25, 2010, http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-3808717 (in
which the president of the national association of the EPS says not only that the austerity measures were
necessary, but also that they were insufficient).
73. The government opened a web-page with the explicit goal of defending the decrees and the
declaration of a social emergency more generally. WEB.PRESIDENCIA.GOV, INFORME ESPECIAL:
EMERGENCIA DE SALUD, http://web.presidencia.gov.co/especial/emergencia_social/index.html (Oct. 4,
2012, 7:31 PM).
74. The National Planning Department circulated an animated defense of the decrees responding
to the many criticisms. DEPARTAMENTO NACIONAL DE PLANEACIO´N, LO BA´SICO DE LA EMERGENCIA
SOCIAL, (Feb. 2010), available at http://web.presidencia.gov.co/especial/emergencia_social/cartilla3.pdf
(last visited Sept. 12, 2012).
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conceptions of the reform, and that popular protest was fueled by private
companies that stood to gain from the prior system.75
Eventually, the CCC declared the ten decrees to be unconstitutional, but
not before national protests from January to March forced the government
to recant on some reforms and revealed enormous grassroots support for the
CCC’s prior decisions on the right to health. When the court announced
that the declaration of social emergency, and therefore the decrees, was un-
constitutional, a cheering crowd received the decision.76 In a pragmatic and
controversial aspect of its decision, the CCC deferred the unconstitutional-
ity of the increased taxation until the end of 2010, allowing the govern-
ment to fund health sector debt while congressional reforms were
adopted.77 In the meantime, the government paid a high political cost for
the attempted reforms, not only because of the unexpectedly intense public
reaction against the emergency decrees, but also because of several accusa-
tions of corruption against both the government and the EPS during this
period.78 Allegations of corruption in the preparation of the studies that had
recommended the decrees were particularly damaging.79
In June 2010, President Juan Manuel Santos came into power and intro-
duced a new scheduled list of benefits, which now includes most of the
previously excluded court-ordered medicines and services.80 The Super-
intendencia de Industria y Comercio (the Superintendent of Industry and
Commerce), the Procuradurı´a (the Office of the Inspector General, which
makes disciplinary investigations of public official misconduct), and the
Contralorı´a (the Office of the Comptroller General, which oversees the ad-
75. See INFORME ESPECIAL: EMERGENCIA DE SALUD, supra note 73. See also Vice-President’s declara-
tions of February 18, 2010, SECRETARIA DE PRENSA, “Reforma a la salud pisa los intereses de quienes se
lucran del actual sistema”: Vicepresidente Santos, http://web.presidencia.gov.co/sp/2010/febrero/18/2918
2010.html; and of the then Minister of Social Protection (equivalent to a Secretary of Health), Carolina
Gutie´rrez and Pablo Correa, Hay muchos crı´ticos con intereses econo´micos, EL ESPECTADOR, Jan. 31, 2010,
http://www.elespectador.com/impreso/negocios/articuloimpreso185210-hay-muchos-criticos-intereses-
economicos-diego-palacio.
76. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], 16 de abril de 2010, Sentencia C-252/10,
at §7.3, available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2010/C-252-10.htm.
77. Id.
78. Carlos Ferna´ndez and Sonia Perilla, Sistema de Salud esta´ en jaque por sobrecostos de medicamentos, EL
TIEMPO, Mar. 10, 2010, http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-7389047.
79. EPS en la emergencia social: Vargas Lleras acusa, Palacio se defende, SEMANA.COM, (Feb. 10, 2010),
http://www.semana.com/salud—seguridad-social/eps-emergencia-social-vargas-lleras-acusa-palacio-defi
ende/134805-3.aspx); Derogara´n norma Uribe da reversa en el uso de cesantı´as en salud, EL TIEMPO, Feb. 12,
2010, http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-3837092; Emergencia Social: Un paso para
adelante y dos para atra´s, SEMANA.COM, (Feb. 7, 2010), http://m.semana.com/salud—seguridad-social/
emergencia-social-paso-para-adelante-dos-para-atras/135132-3.aspx.
80. In July 2012 the government adopted a new scheduled list that included many formerly non-
POS treatments and medications. MINISTERIO DE SALUD Y PROTECCIO´N SOCIAL: Plan Obligatorio de
Salud, Listado completo de medicamentos del POS – Anexo 1 (2011), available at http://www.pos.gov.co/
Documents/Noticias%20del%20POS/Anexo%201%20Listado%20de%20medicamentos%20de%20
POS%20%20%20Acuerdo%2029%20de%202011%20de%20la%20CRES.pdf; MINISTERIO DE SALUD
Y PROTECCIO´N SOCIAL: PLAN OBLIGATORIO DE SALUD, Listado completo de procedimientos y servicios del POS
– Anexo 2 (2011), available at http://www.pos.gov.co/Documents/Noticias%20del%20POS/Anexo%202
%20Listado%20de%20procedimientos%20y%20servicios%20del%20POS%20%20.pdf.
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ministration of public funds) are currently investigating EPS mismanage-
ment.81 There are also criminal investigations against many former
members of the previous government, in particular those responsible for
reimbursing the EPS.82 During the past two years, several EPS have gone
bankrupt, and the government has taken over their administration to guar-
antee healthcare coverage.83 Non-governmental organizations such as Ob-
servatorio del Medicamento reveal that the Uribe government negotiated
unreasonably high prices with international pharmaceutical companies for
many expensive brand-name medicines on the scheduled list.84 These new
allegations softened earlier critiques of a “government by judges” and fo-
cused attention on the health system’s crisis of corruption and mismanage-
ment as well as on pharmaceutical companies’ pressure and co-optation.85
In 2011, Colombia adopted Law 1438, which addressed many of the
criticisms of the healthcare system and avoided the types of reforms that
sparked so much protest under the Uribe proposal of 2010. As well as seek-
ing to improve the accountability and functionality of the EPS, Law 1438
established procedures for the gradual unification of benefits for the con-
tributory and the subsidized regimes as ordered by the Constitutional Court
in 2008, earmarked resources for primary and preventive care, and ordered
the updating of the POS every two years.86 It also ordered full, free health-
care coverage for children.87 Despite these efforts, there is a persistent per-
ception of the system’s crisis as well as an ongoing discussion about the
81. For the Juan Manuel Santos report on the EPS’s financial health, see SUPERINTENDENCIA DE
SALUD, INFORME SITUACO´N FINANCIERA ENTIDADES PROMOTORAS DE SALUD Y REGIMEN SUBSIDIADO
VIGENCIA 2011 (2012), available at http://www.supersalud.gov.co/supersalud/LinkClick.aspx?file
ticket=GS3WyXZPAL0%3D&tabid=93&mid=1489.
82. See, e.g., Allanan sedes de cinco EPS por investigaciones de corrupcio´n, SEMANA.COM (May 24, 2011),
http://www.semana.com/nacion/allanan-sedes-cinco-eps-investigaciones-corrupcion/157268-3.aspx.
83. See id. For news coverage of the issue, see, e.g., Redaccio´n Vivir, So´lo el 19% de las EPS son
solventes, EL ESPECTADOR, Apr. 21, 2012, http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/salud/articulo-294436-
humana-vivir-oficialmente-intervenida.
84.  See generally OBSERVATORIO DEL MEDICAMENTO COLOMBIA, http://www.observamed.org/ (last
visited Nov. 7, 2012) (Observatorio del Medicamento Colombia’s coverage of the issue). The Juan
Manuel Santos government has been trying to reduce the high prices allowed by the previous govern-
ment. See Norbey Quevedo, Lupa a Precios de 19 Medicamentos, EL ESPECTADOR, May 21, 2012, http://
www.elespectador.com/noticias/investigacion/articulo-347766-lupa-precios-de-medicamentos.
85.  See, e.g., Allanan sedes de cinco EPS por investigaciones de corrupcio´n, supra note 82; EPS implicadas en
corrupcio´n serı´an intervenidas, EL TIEMPO, July 5, 2011, http://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/ARTICULO-
WEB-NEW_NOTA_INTERIOR-9325524.html; Supersalud abrio´ 326 investigaciones contra EPS en
2010, EL TIEMPO, May 11, 2011, http://www.eltiempo.com/vida-de-hoy/salud/ARTICULO-WEB-
NEW_NOTA_INTERIOR-9328367.html.
86. L. 1438/11,19 de enero de 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] at arts. 18–19. The law also made
adjustments in response to criticisms, such as having EPS technical scientific committees respond to
patient complaints, id. at art. 27, and making EPS coverage valid nationwide and not limited to certain
cities, id. at art. 22. It also created a national commission to control the prices of medications, id. at art.
87, and guaranteed doctor autonomy when ordering medicines and treatments, id. at art. 105.
87. L. 1438/11,19 de enero de 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], art 19.
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need for further healthcare system reform, including a proposal to return to
the state provision of health care and eliminate EPS mediation altogether.88
One thing that remains from the 2010 impasse is the importance of the
concept of the right to health, at least formally. As of September 2012, the
government is considering a new health reform law it calls the Statute for
the Right to Health.89 The new Minister of Health, Alejandro Gaviria, who
is a long-standing critic of court-ordered spending, has emphasized the
need for financial, rather than medical, expertise.90 Because the quantity of
right to health litigation has not been reduced by the reforms, the issue of
justiciability will be sure to receive attention.91
As shown in this section, Colombia has experienced an intense level of
litigation, adjudication, and enforcement in its evolution of the right to
health. Judicial leadership has ingrained into the popular consciousness a
sense of healthcare entitlement. Unscrupulous companies have manipulated
complex financial reimbursements and entitlements under the insurance
scheme. Together, these factors brought about fiscal crisis and protest. This
may be contrasted with the justiciability of the right to health in South
Africa.
III. LOW-INTENSITY JUSTICIABILITY: SOUTH AFRICA
In contrast to Colombia, South Africa’s engagement with the right to
health has been marked by a low-intensity approach to justiciability. The
right to health has been interpreted and enforced by tentative, incremental,
and partial steps on the part of the Constitutional Court of South Africa
(“CCSA”), and a less widespread challenge to, and disruption of, the overall
health system. Despite vigorous contestations around health rights and re-
markably successful instances of social movement mobilization and repre-
sentation, the right to health remains a changeable discursive resource that
88. For an analysis of the crisis in 2012, see Remedios para el sistema de salud, SEMANA.COM  (July 14,
2012), http://www.semana.com/nacion/remedios-para-sistema-salud/180758-3.aspx; El panorama del sis-
tema de salud es “drama´tico”, dice el procurador, SEMANA.COM (July 12, 2012), http://www.semana.com/
nacion/panorama-del-sistema-salud-dramatico-dice-procurador/180640-3.aspx; El SOS que envio´ el sector
salud al Presidente Santos, SEMANA.COM (May 22, 2012), http://www.semana.com/nacion/sos-envio-
sector-salud-presidente-santos/177562-3.aspx. See also Laura Victoria Botero, La academia plantea reforma
estructural del sistema de salud, EL COLOMBIANO, Sept. 10, 2012, http://www.elcolombiano.com/Banco
Conocimiento/L/la_academia_plantea_reforma_estructural_del_sistema_de_salud/la_academia_plantea
_reforma_estructural_del_sistema_de_salud.asp; Colprensa, Avanza acto legislativo que eleva la salud a
derecho fundamental, EL PAI´S, Sept. 11, 2012, http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/colombia/noticias/avanza-
acto-legislativo-eleva-salud-derecho-fundamental.
89. La salud necesita un experto en finanzas y no un me´dico (entrevista con Alejandro Gaviria),
VANGUARDIA LIBERAL, Sept. 16, 2012, http://www.vanguardia.com/actualidad/colombia/174571-la-
salud-necesita-un-experto-en-finanzas-y-no-un-medico.
90. Id.
91. The 2011 data published in 2012 show a slight increase in 2011 (105,947 right to health
tutelas) in relation to 2010 (94,502). DEFENSORIA DEL PUEBLO, LA TUTELA Y EL DERECHO A LA SALUD
2011: 20 AN˜OS DE USO EFECTIVO DE LA TUTELA 1992–2011 104 (2012).
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will be shown to reflect a less tangible entitlement than that presently pro-
vided in Colombian constitutional law.92
Like Colombia’s Constitution, South Africa’s Constitution of 1996 came
at the end of a long period of repression and violence. While Colombia’s
Constitution may be characterized by the “social rule of law” concept,
South Africa’s can be described as belonging to the category of “transforma-
tive constitutionalism.”93 This goal seeks to create a new legal and political
system from the legacy of officially sanctioned racism.94 Expanding access
to health care by entrenching the right to health care is part of an overall
project of transformation, as is the establishment of a new, separate Consti-
tutional Court, itself an innovation in a common law system. The CCSA
occupies a major role in transformative constitutionalism, which has been
explicitly endorsed by its judges.95 While access and standing rules for the
CCSA are designed to be lenient,96 and submissions from amicus curiae are
welcomed,97 there is no equivalent to the tutela in South Africa. Further-
more, the CCSA hears vastly fewer cases than its equivalent in Colombia—
now averaging around 25 per year.98 The CCSA also shares constitutional
jurisdiction with the South African Supreme Court of Appeal and the High
Courts, yet the main litigation involving the right to health has been dealt
with by the CCSA.
Another major difference between the two countries is the design and
financing of the healthcare system. In South Africa, health care is delivered
in two tiers. The private health system, which covers less than 15% of the
population, consists of general practitioners and private hospitals funded
92. See supra text accompanying notes 17 and 22 for the textual wording.
93. See Karl E. Klare, Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism, 14 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS.
146 (1998).
94. Id. at 147. For the judicial recognition of the role that race played in health care allocations, see
Soobramoney, para 20, fn 10, (“We have only recently emerged from a system of government in which
the provision of health services depended on race. On occasions seriously injured persons were refused
access to ambulance services or admission to the nearest or best equipped hospital on racial grounds.”).
95. See Dikgang Moseneke, Fourth Bram Fischer Memorial Lecture: Transformative Adjudication, 18 S.
AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 309, 314 (2002) (arguing that “a creative jurisprudence of equality coupled with
substantive interpretation of the content of ‘socio-economic’ rights should restore social justice as a
premier foundational value of our constitutional democracy side by side, if not interactively with,
human dignity, equality, freedom, accountability, responsiveness, and openness. Implicit in this pro-
position is that the Constitution enjoins the judiciary to uphold and advance its transformative
design.”).
96. S. AFR. CONST., §§ 38, 167(6) (allowing any person “when it is in the interests of justice and
with leave of the Constitutional Court—[to] (a) bring the matter directly to the Constitutional Court;
or (b) appeal directly to the Constitutional Court from another court”).
97. See In re certain amicus curiae applications: Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (5)
SA 713 (CC).
98. Between 1995 and 2011, the CCSA handed down a total of 411 judgments. See CONST. COURT
OF S. AFR., Overview of the Judgments of the Constitutional Court of South Africa 1994 to 2005 (June 2011),
available at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/judgments/Judgments-Summarised-Delivered-
1995-2005; CONST. COURT OF S. AFR. Overview of the Judgments of the Constitutional Court of South Africa
Since 2006, (June 2011), available at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/judgments/Judgments-
Summarised-Delivered-2006-August-2011.
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mainly by private medical schemes.99 A further 21% of the population re-
lies on the private sector, mainly for primary care on an out-of-pocket basis.
The remaining 64% of the population depends on the public sector for all
healthcare services.100 Further aggravating these imbalances, almost half of
the country’s healthcare expenditures go to the private medical scheme, and
public health users have been radically under-resourced: in 2005, less than
ZAR 1300 (USD 160) was spent per person for government primary care
and hospital services, with a strong tilt towards curative hospital care.101
This imbalance is further amplified by the disease profiles of those of low
socio-economic status who must rely on the public system: HIV/AIDS; tu-
berculosis; maternal, infant, and child mortality; non-communicable dis-
eases; and the effects of injury and violence.102 This is a clear legacy of
apartheid, reflecting the racial agenda, gender biases, and lack of resources
for the provinces during the apartheid regime.103
South Africa’s jurisprudence on the constitutional right to health is re-
sponsive to this context, as we shall see, but has had little direct effect on
the deep imbalances of the healthcare system. The CCSA’s jurisprudence on
the right to health, which commenced six years after the CCC’s, is mark-
edly distinct from the strident steps taken in Colombia. While each body of
jurisprudence has developed through the intermediary of international
human rights law, and with mutual comparative influences such as the Ger-
man Basic Law,104 the differences in the language of jurisprudence—and
the relative scarcity of Spanish-to-English translations—have meant the
two are neither directly cited, nor apparently read by the other court. Of
course, members of the Constitutional Courts of each jurisdiction are still
undoubtedly in conversation, through the transjudicial dialogue that takes
place through conferences, websites, and other informal forums.105 Yet they
are usefully compared to highlight the distinct treatment given to the con-
99. Medical schemes are South African private health insurance companies, defined by the South
Africa Medical Scheme Act as “the business of undertaking liability in return for a premium or contri-
bution.” Act 131 of 1998 § 1.1. For coverage, see generally Hoosen Coovadia et al., The Health and
Health System of South Africa: Historical Roots of Current Public Health Challenges, 374 THE LANCET 817
(2009).
100. See Coovadia, supra note 99, at 827.
101. Id. at 826–27.
102. Id. at 818.
103. See Dep’t of Health, White Paper for the Transformation of the Health System in South Africa, S.
Afr. Gov’t Info. (April 1997), http://www.info.gov.za/whitepapers/1997/health.htm (last visited Oct.
14, 2012). In 1997 the new South African government set out the challenge of transforming the legacy
of apartheid in health care provision. Id. (“Although classified as a middle-income country and spend-
ing 8.5% of GDP on health care[,] South Africa exhibits major disparities and inequalities. This is the
result of former apartheid policies which ensured racial, gender and provincial disparities.”).
104. See generally ERIKA DE WET, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ENFORCEABILITY OF ECONOMIC AND SO-
CIAL RIGHTS: THE MEANING OF THE GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL MODEL FOR SOUTH AFRICA (1996). For
the influence of the German model on Colombia through the creation of the institutional guarantee and
the social rule of law, see supra notes 18 and 28.
105. For a description of this dialogue, see Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44
HARV. INT’L L.J. 191, 197 (2003).
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stitutional right to health. We suggest that a characteristically “low-inten-
sity” form of justiciability flows from CCSA’s doctrinal stance, which we
characterize as “reasonableness review,” as well as the formative context of
the HIV/AIDS pandemic. We draw these links in the following sections.
A. 1998–2002: Reasonableness Review
Soon after the CCSA confirmed the justiciability of economic and social
rights in 1998,106 litigation on the right to health commenced. Soobramoney
involved a claim by a chronically and terminally ill, recently destitute
claimant who sought renal dialysis.107 A public hospital had rejected his
request on the basis of a rationing process that favored patients with a
chance of long-term recovery.108 Soobramoney argued that the refusal de-
prived him of his right to life and his right to emergency medical treat-
ment.109 The CCSA declined to hear the matter on these bases, holding that
renal dialysis was a life-prolonging intervention, rather than an immediate
remedial treatment that would be associated with an emergency.110 In par-
ticular, it held that a rationing process that apportioned scarce resources
among those who urgently need services did not infringe upon the right to
life.111
Instead, the CCSA explored the state’s obligations under the right to
access health care.112 The CCSA conceded the tragic choice undergirding
the case, and the implications for weighing Soobramoney’s life against the
lives of others.113 Yet the CCSA also emphasized that the resources of the
hospital in question, and of the public healthcare system in general, were
scarce.114 Rationing was an everyday reality. Adopting an orientation that
was utilitarian despite being coded with the language of rights,115 the
CCSA accepted that public health must be organized for the welfare of all,
and not biased towards those whose claims had managed to reach the
courts.116
106. In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of S. Afr., 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC).
107. Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, Kwazulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC).
108. Id. at 769 para. 3.
109. Id. at 770 para. 7.
110. Id. at 774 para. 21.
111. Id. at 773–74 para. 19.
112. Id. at 774 para. 22.
113. Id. at 784 paras. 57–59.
114. Id. at 769–70 paras. 2–3; 771 para. 11; 774–75 para. 24; 776–77 paras. 30–31.
115. The language of rights is often used to refer to interests or claims that trump utilitarian
concerns because of their particular normative force. See generally, Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in
THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984) (presenting the metaphor of the trump card). Yet
the CCSA used this language while balancing other concerns. See Karin Lehmann, In Defense of the
Constitutional Court: Litigating Economic and Social Rights and the Myth of the Minimum Core, 22 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 163, 169 (2006) (suggesting that the Soobramoney decision is better characterized as
utilitarian rather than rights-based).
116. Soobramoney 1998 (1) SA at 784 para. 58.
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The standard for the right to health care was the reasonableness test,
which would become key to the CCSA’s economic and social rights juris-
prudence. In highlighting that Section 27 of the Constitution guaranteed
only an obligation to “take reasonable measures,” rather than a stand-alone
subjective right, the CCSA introduced a quasi-procedural scrutiny of the
government’s actions that exemplified a careful judicial restraint.117 The
CCSA accepted that the public hospital’s rationing process, itself subject to
ethical guidelines, was reasonable.118 There was a “nation-wide problem” of
limited dialysis machines, and the court deferred to the “guidelines . . . to
assist the persons working in these clinics to make the agonizing choices
which have to be made in deciding who should receive treatment, and who
[should] not.”119 The CCSA also found reasonable the provincial health de-
partment’s prior budgetary allocations.120
Undoubtedly, the Soobramoney decision created a temporary chilling effect
on further health rights claims.121 If the CCSA were willing to defer to
governmental and hospital decision-making, and concede the scarcity of
state resources, it appeared that the prospects for other complaints were
low. Soobramoney’s claim had not attracted much public sympathy or a
significant social movement, although many noted the tragedy when he
passed away three days after judgment.122 The case contains clues for the
present orientation of reasonableness review, which is a rejection of high-
cost treatments as a state responsibility, an acknowledgment of the ines-
capable tragedy in healthcare allocations, and a formulation of deference to
hospitals and government when making such decisions.
Reasonableness review received new attention after a successful com-
plaint in relation to the right to housing. In the famous Grootboom decision,
the CCSA held that the government’s housing policy was unreasonable be-
cause it had failed to cater for vulnerable individuals and groups in the
position of the complainant.123 Grootboom is directly relevant to right to
health jurisprudence because it signaled that the reasonableness standard
could have some teeth. The CCSA was prepared to scrutinize the govern-
ment’s housing policy, asking questions of it that clearly went beyond the
standards of rationality in government decision-making—questions that
drew uncommon judicial attention to the poor and vulnerable who were
117. Id. at 771 para. 10.
118. Id. at 775 para. 25.
119. Id. at 775 para. 24.
120. Id. at 776 para. 29.
121. Craig Scott & Philip Alston, Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A
Comment on Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise, 16 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 206, 241 (2000)
(worrying that the CCSA’s decision, despite presenting “a certain conception of fairness in allocation,”
“arguably does so in a way that ends up coming close to denying that any given person or group can
legitimately assert a priority constitutional claim on resources.”).
122. Albie Sachs, Social and Economic Rights: Can They Be Made Justiciable? 53 SMU L. REV. 1381,
1386 (2000).
123. Gov’t of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), paras. 52–54, 53–56.
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omitted from, or burdened by, a particular policy.124  This approach would
open the way for a more careful scrutiny of those who would be burdened
by a particular health policy in the Treatment Action Campaign (“TAC”) deci-
sion to come.125  The CCSA also declined to adjudicate a justiciable, subjec-
tive “minimum core” of the right to housing, finding the more flexible
standard of reasonableness to be more consistent with its own competence
for economic and social rights adjudication.126 This general orientation
would continue for parallel litigation in sanitation, electricity, and water,127
all rights for which the minimum core is much more extensively defined in
international law.128
Even though the CCSA was reluctant to prescribe entitlements during
this phase, it nevertheless achieved “a standard of transparency in govern-
ment decision making” that might not have been achieved without the
justiciable right.129 Moreover, the court’s orientation also ensured that it
would peer into the consideration given to economically vulnerable
groups.130 As a result, government policies are required to focus on both
short-term and long-term beneficiaries in the design of public schemes. Of
course, to insist that policy does not ignore the needs of vulnerable groups
does not in itself confer any tangible benefits on them.131 Nonetheless, at-
tention to vulnerable groups constitutes a potent standard when combined
with the equality guarantee.132 This orientation reflects a degree of
weighted utilitarianism in the CCSA’s rights jurisprudence—that is, a re-
124. SMU L. REV. 1381, 1386 (2000). Understanding Grootboom: A Response to Cass Sunstein, 12
CONST. F. 41, 41 (2001).
125. See Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 713. For the impact of this decision, see infra, Part
II.B.
126. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA at 65–66 paras. 29–33. For a critique of the claim of determinacy for
the minimum core in both international and comparative constitutional law, see Young, The Minimum
Core of Economic and Social Rights, supra note 41.
127. Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC); Compare City of Johannesburg v. Mazibuko
2009 (3) SA 592 (SCA); Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2008 (4) ASA 471 (W); [2009] ZAGPHC 106
(18 Apr. 2008); Case No. 06/13865, High Court of South Africa (Witswatersrand Local Division).
128. Compare U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Com-
ment No. 15: The Right to Water (Art. 11 of the ICESCR) U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002 (Jan. 20, 2003)
with U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 4:
The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11(1) of the Covenant), U.N. Doc. E/1992/23 (Dec. 13, 2003),
and U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 7:
The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11(1)): Forced Evictions, U.N. Doc. E/1998/22 (May 20, 1997).
Cf. SCOTT LECKIE, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, UNDP HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000, HOUSING
RIGHTS § 18 (Nov. 20, 1999), http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2000/papers/leckie.pdf.
129. Puneet K. Sandhu, A Legal Right to Health Care: What Can the United States Learn from Foreign
Models of Health Rights Jurisprudence?, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1178 (2007). But see Minister of Health v.
New Clicks S. Afr. (Pty.) Ltd. 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC) (exhibiting the stand-alone role of administrative
justice requirements).
130. See, e.g., Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46.
131. Marius Pieterse, Possibilities and Pitfalls in the Domestic Enforcement of Social Rights: Contemplating
the South African Experience, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 882, 891–902 (2004).
132. This has become more evident after the CCSA’s decision in Khosa v. Minister of Social Dev.
2004 (6) SA 505 (CC). See Marius Pieterse, Resuscitating Socio-Economic Rights: Constitutional Entitlements to
Health Care Services, 22 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 473, 493 (2006).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLH\26-1\HLH108.txt unknown Seq: 25 22-APR-13 15:45
2013 / The Comparative Fortunes of the Right to Health 203
luctance to establish the minimum substance of economic and social rights,
along with an acknowledgement of the special burdens experienced by the
poor and vulnerable. This orientation was to remain until the implications
of the HIV/AIDS pandemic exploded onto the judicial scene.
B. The Formative Context of the HIV/AIDS Pandemic
The incrementalism of reasonableness review was to change in light of
the overwhelming nature of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in South Africa. On
the one hand, HIV/AIDS presented a disease of such seriousness and such
drastic ramifications that it could not be ignored. On the other hand, Presi-
dent Mbeki’s apparent denial of the link between HIV/AIDS and the ANC
administration’s prevarications and delay in organizing a medical response
raised alarming implications for the spread and treatment of the disease.133
In such a scenario, the standard of reasonableness became more robust.
The TAC case was brought by Treatment Action Campaign, a South Afri-
can activist organization defending the rights of people living with HIV/
AIDS, against the government’s handling of the prevention of mother-to-
child transmission of HIV at childbirth.134 After mobilization by the TAC,
a pharmaceutical company had donated a five-year stock of an antiretroviral
drug (“ARV”), Nevirapine, to prevent mother-to-child transmission.135 Yet
the government prohibited the use of the ARV in public hospitals, apart
from its limited trial in 16 public sites.136
The TAC claimed that the restriction on the drug was unreasonable, es-
pecially in light of the gravity of the consequences—transmission of HIV/
AIDS—of denying access to the drug.137 It based its arguments both on the
right to health and the specific right of children to health care. It produced
evidence of doctors, medical experts, and patients about the ramifications of
the policy and its arbitrariness. The government defended its position on
the grounds that the effective provision of ARVs was unaffordable (because
it would require testing, counseling services, and formula milk), that the
efficacy and safety of Nevirapine was not proven, and that the use of
Nevirapine would risk a negative impact on public health.138
The CCSA’s examination of the reasonableness of the government’s pol-
icy was robust. The CCSA peered behind the reasons given for the seem-
ingly rational restriction, finding all of them wanting. It held that the costs
of testing and counseling were minimal.139 Furthermore, the safety of the
133. For an exploration of the attraction that President Mbeki felt for the “dissident” view on HIV/
AIDS, see DIDIER FASSIN, WHEN BODIES REMEMBER: EXPERIENCES AND POLITICS OF AIDS IN SOUTH
AFRICA 2–17 (2007).
134. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA at 7 para. 2.
135. Id. at 12 para. 19.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 8 para. 4.
138. Id. at 10–11 paras. 14–15.
139. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA at 18 paras. 49–51; 22 para. 71.
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drug had been vouched for by the South African Medical Review Board,
which had registered the drug for private sale.140 Holding that the restric-
tion of the ARV to designated sites was unreasonable because it excluded
people who could reasonably have been included in the ambit of the pol-
icy,141 the CCSA ordered the government to end the restriction and man-
dated the provision of counseling and other necessary services, the latter
enforceable through a contempt of court order. It allowed for the
revisability of the Nevirapine ARV treatment if better treatments became
available. It also declined to order a structural injunction to require the
government to carry out each concrete step, noting its expectation that the
government would carry out the declaratory order. Despite the mandatory
elements of the testing and counseling remedy, there was nothing
equivalent to the sort of structural order of transformation produced by the
health rights cases in Colombia.142
Vigorous organization and mobilization on the part of the TAC arguably
made the TAC case and the orders that followed easier for the CCSA. Be-
cause of considerable public attention, public marches, and other mobiliza-
tions during the course of the litigation, some provincial governments had
already made significant concessions and changes prior to the decision.143
Several additional mobilizations by the TAC, regular monitoring of health
clinics, and treatment literacy programs for mothers after the decision en-
sured that the orders were implemented and that many lives were saved.144
The activities of the TAC bear much of the credit for the protective reach
of the right to health into the government’s HIV/AIDS policy.145 The TAC
had drawn membership from people living with HIV/AIDS and supporters
of people living with HIV/AIDS. The profile of this social movement
crossed race and class lines.146 By the time of the TAC case, its members
were already involved in a range of national and international protest ac-
tions involving sit-ins, singing, and other responses, as well as a didactic
treatment literacy campaign.147 The leadership of the TAC had borrowed
140. Id. at 10 paras. 12–13.
141. Id. at 22 para. 70, 32 para. 125.
142. See supra, Part II.B, discussing Sentencia T-760.
143. Mark Heywood, Current Developments: Preventing Mother-to-Child HIV Transmission in South Af-
rica: Background, Strategies and Outcomes of the Treatment Action Campaign Against the Minister of Health, 19
S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 278, 281–82, 287–95, 300–03, 310–12  (2003) (detailing the TAC’s mobiliza-
tion and litigation strategies prior to, and during, the TAC case).
144. Pride Chigwedere et al., Estimating the Lost Benefits of Antiretroviral Drug Use in South Africa, 49
J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 411, 412 (2008).
145. Heywood, supra note 143.
146. See STEVEN FRIEDMAN & SHAUNA MOTTIAR, REWARDING ENGAGEMENT?: THE TREATMENT
ACTION CAMPAIGN AND THE POLITICS OF HIV/AIDS 34 (2004), http://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/files/Friedman%
20Mottier%20A%20Moral%20to%20the%20Tale%20Long%20Version.pdf (a case study for the Uni-
versity of KwaZulu-Natal project, Globalisation, Marginalisation and New Social Movements in post-
apartheid South Africa).
147. William Forbath, Cultural Transformation, Deep Institutional Reform, and ESR Practice: South
Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign, in STONES OF HOPE: HOW AFRICAN ACTIVISTS RECLAIM HUMAN
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heavily from the anti-apartheid repertoire as well as tactics from foreign
anti-AIDS groups, such as the U.S. ActUp campaign.148 Thus, by the time
of the case, it was a significant political force.
Indeed, earlier mobilizations around the right to health had themselves
enhanced the profile of the TAC case. One case in particular spurred a con-
certed effort to seek to reduce the cost of essential medicines in South Af-
rica. The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (“PMA”) litigation
involved an ongoing claim, begun in 1997, by pharmaceutical companies
about protecting their monopolies on drug prices.149 This litigation was a
response to amendments to the Patents Act that made generic medicines
more available.150 Pharmaceutical companies argued that the legislation in-
fringed on their constitutional right to property, along with other rights.151
The government’s early defense of its legislation was lumbering and ineffec-
tive. The delay in the courts had postponed the price savings of an increased
access of generic medicines for over one year. During this delay, the TAC
sought to join the action as amicus in 2001 and defend the access regime on
the basis of the right to health.152 Its remarkable success in bringing in-
creased South African and worldwide attention to this issue resulted in the
withdrawal of the case by the pharmaceutical companies as well as a boost
in the TAC’s local credibility and readiness for its own litigation.153
The activities of the TAC, other legal organizations, and social move-
ments organized around the issue of HIV/AIDS have been key to the
emerging right to health in South Africa. These organizations have com-
bined sophisticated modes of public protest with a highly selective and
targeted use of constitutional litigation.
Has the formative context of the HIV/AIDS pandemic carved out a sin-
gular, and unique, duty of treatment in South Africa? Does it signal a cura-
tive rather than preventive meaning of the constitutional right to health?
Other successful litigations around the right to health concerning the spe-
cial protection of those in detention to medical treatment have also involved
RIGHTS TO CHALLENGE GLOBAL POVERTY, 51, 77–86 (Jeremy Perelman & Lucie White, eds., 2011)
(describing the TAC’s efforts at education).
148. Group Telephone Interview with Zackie Achmat, National Chairperson, TAC, in Bellagio,
Italy. (Dec. 2006).
149. Katharine G. Young, Securing Health through Rights, in INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC
HEALTH: PATENT LAW AND ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 364 (Thomas Pogge, Matthew Rimmer &
Kim Rubenstein, eds., 2010).
150. Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 90 of 1997 § 10.
151. The Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n of S. Afr. v. Gov’t of S. Afr., Notice of Motion, Case Number 4183/98,
in the High Court of South Africa (Transvaal Provincial Division). S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 25 states,
inter alia, that “(1) No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application,
and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. (2) Property may be expropriated only in
terms of law of general application—(a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and (b) subject to
compensation. . . .”
152. See generally Mark Heywood, Debunking ‘Conglomo-talk’: A Case Study of the Amicus Curiae as an
Instrument for Advocacy, Investigation and Mobilisation, 6 L., DEMOCRACY AND DEV. 144 (2002).
153. Id. at 157; see also YOUNG, CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at
370–71.
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HIV/AIDS.154 Yet the prominence of the HIV/AIDS issue is understandable
in light of the terrible pandemic experienced by South Africa. The CCSA
affirmed that HIV/AIDS is “the greatest threat to public health in our
country.”155 We suggest that the extension of the right to health to other
diseases, many of them associated with poverty, such as tuberculosis and
cancer, has come about indirectly through the emphasis on drug af-
fordability and regulation within the HIV/AIDS campaigns. Moreover, the
way in which the ARVs act to both prevent the spread of HIV, as well as to
treat it, indicates a certain collapsibility of the curative/preventive para-
digm.156 Since 2002, the right to health has been litigated more indi-
rectly—through duties to regulate the healthcare system and to provide for
the social determinants of health through other economic and social goods.
C. Post-2002: Healthcare Regulation and the Social Determinants of Health
More recent protections of the right to health by the CCSA have been
indirect. The National Health Act, passed in 2004, attempted to correct
some inequities by centralizing power and responsibility for primary health
care within the provinces.157 Nonetheless, the public sector continues to
perpetuate the inequities of health care due to the lack of resources, poor
management, and aging infrastructure.158 In some instances, while access
has increased, the quality of healthcare services has deteriorated or remains
poor.159 Litigation has focused on the government’s right to regulate the
prices of medicines and the provision of private healthcare services, usually
according to administrative law principles. Attempts to provide what we
might call indirect support for the right to health has come from other
economic and social rights litigation, affecting rights to access the “social
determinants of health,” such as clean water, sanitation, and housing.160
The CCSA has adopted the position that with regard to the pharmaceuti-
cal industry, the government performs its duty to protect the right of access
154.  See Carole Cooper, Health Rights Litigation: Cautious Constitutionalism, in LITIGATING HEALTH
RIGHTS: CAN COURTS BRING MORE JUSTICE TO HEALTH? 190, 209 (Alicia Ely Yamin & Siri Gloppen,
eds., 2011); S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 35(2)(e) (guarantees the right of prisoners “to conditions of deten-
tion that are consistent with human dignity, including . . . the provision, at state expense, of . . .
medical treatment).
155. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA at 26 para. 93.
156. Noah Novogrodsky, The Duty of Treatment: Human Rights and the HIV/AIDS Pandemic, 12 YALE
H.R. & DEV. L.J. 1, 2 (2009) (describing the treatment processes of antiretroviral medications).
157. See National Health Act 61 of 2003, chs. 3–5 (establishing health governance at national,
provincial, and district levels).
158. See generally Coovadia, supra note 99.
159. SARA BENNETT & LUCY GILSON, DFID HEALTH SYSTEMS RESOURCE CENTER, HEALTH FI-
NANCING: DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING PRO-POOR POLICIES (2001).
160. For a discussion of social determinants of health, see DANIELS, supra note 6, at 79–102 (exam-
ining the associations between daily living conditions, the general distribution of resources, and health
inequities). For international support from the public health field, see also WHO, Outcome of the World
Conference on Social Determinants of Health, 65th Sess., WHA65.8 (May 26, 2012), available at http://
www.who.int/sdhconference/background/en/index.html.
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to healthcare services as a regulator, rather than a provider, of these ser-
vices.161 In Minister of Health v. New Clicks South Africa (Pty.) Ltd., the
CCSA held that the government was constitutionally obliged, as well as
permitted, to take reasonable measures to control drug prices through
medicine regulation in order to make medicines “more accessible and af-
fordable by means of a transparent pricing system.”162 Although the case
was decided by recourse to administrative principles, rather than economic
and social rights, the judgment noted the importance of legislation aimed
at securing affordable medicines to realize economic and social rights like
the right to health care.163
The court has also pressured the legislature to regulate health care. The
constitutional requirement to legislate and to regulate comes not only from
the positive obligations flowing from the right to health provision itself,164
but also from the explicit duty to protect, as well as respect and fulfill,
constitutional rights.165 This duty places an obligation to enact and enforce
legislation that is required to regulate and enable private actors to fulfill
their duties in socio-economic spheres.166 Such a duty becomes more promi-
nent in the context of the privatization of health and other social services.167
This duty exists alongside the “horizontal application of constitutional
rights,” in which rights may be constitutionally binding on private rela-
tionships that do not explicitly include the state.168 Because the CCSA has
been reluctant to intervene in exactly how such horizontality changes the
private common law, the pressure on the legislature to regulate according
to the Constitution is even greater. In such cases, the CCSA has relied pri-
marily on the legislation at issue, rather than allowing parties to bypass it
to proceed directly to the constitutional standard.169
This position has impacted health care through non-constitutional cases
without direct recourse to the right to health. In targeting the prices
charged by two companies in the Hazel Tau litigation, for example, the
TAC and other organizations complained that the cost of ARVs breached
161. For a three-part division into duties of provision, regulation, and obligations, see Jonathan
Berger, Litigating for Social Justice in Post-apartheid South Africa: A Focus on Health and Education, in
COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 38.
162. New Clicks S. Afr. (Pty.) Ltd., 2006 (2) SA at 343 para. 16.
163. Id. at 524–25 paras. 704, 707.
164. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 27(2).
165. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 7(2).
166. SANDRA LIEBENBERG, SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS: ADJUDICATION UNDER A TRANSFORMATIVE
CONSTITUTION 332 (2010).
167. Id. (citing Grootboom, para. 35, where the CCSA stated, with respect to the right to housing,
that the State is responsible not only for the provision of houses, but also for enabling individuals to
themselves provide housing, through legislative and other measures).
168. Id. See also S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 8. For an early flagging of this issue, see Frank I.
Michelman, The Constitution, Social Rights and Reason, 14 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 299 (1998).
169. See, e.g., New Clicks S. Afr. (Pty.) Ltd., 2006 (2) SA 311.
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the excessive pricing provision of the Competition Act.170 In argument
before the Competition Commission, a statutory body authorized to investi-
gate and control restrictive business practices, medical experts testified on
the need for a complex regimen of different ARVs to treat HIV/AIDS effec-
tively.171 Economic evidence compared the high cost of drugs in South Af-
rica with the costs of generic alternatives elsewhere. In a non-judicial
outcome that went further than the TAC’s success behind the PMA litiga-
tion, which had only resulted in the withdrawal of the companies’ litigation
against moves to allow licensing arrangements under the Patents Act, the
companies settled, agreeing to license the manufacture of generics subject
to a maximum 5% royalty. Further out-of-court settlements followed, thus
vastly lowering the costs of medicines, without any involvement of the
CCSA.172 No equivalent litigious processes were attempted in Colombia, in
part due to the judicial availability of tutelas and the efforts of non-litiga-
tion action, which contributed to a lack of patient incentives to seek reduc-
tions in treatment costs directly with pharmaceutical companies.173
Attempts to create indirect support for the right to health, through the
litigation of other economic and social rights cases affecting the social de-
terminants of health, have sometimes been effective.174 The constitutional
rights to access food, water, housing, education, and social security have
great import for health, and have been litigated far more often, relative to
the right to health care, in direct contrast to the Colombian experience. The
successful claim in Grootboom introduced a new pressure on policymaking:
to give attention to the needs of vulnerable groups. A raft of other housing
cases also led to a degree of protection for communities rendered homeless
or insecure in informal settlements, by prescribing a duty of “meaningful
engagement” and a search for alternative accommodation prior to evic-
tion,175 and by dispensing with other legal formalities in emergency hous-
170. Statement of Complaint, Hazel Tau & Others v. GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer Ingelheim, Com-
petition Commission of S. Afr. (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.section27.org.za/wp-content/uploads/
2010/10/TauvGSKevidenceAndLegalSubmissions.pdf.
171. The Competition Commission is “a statutory body constituted in terms of the Competition
Act, No 89 of 1998 by the Government of South Africa empowered to investigate, control and evaluate
restrictive business practices, abuse of dominant positions and mergers.” COMPETITION COMMISSION OF
SOUTH AFRICA, http://www.compcom.co.za/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2012). For further description, see
Cooper, supra note 154; Berger, supra note 161.
172. Berger, supra note 161.
173. Peter Maybarduke, Colombian NGOs File Compulsory License Request on Lopinavir/Ritonavir, AM.
U. PROGRAM ON INFORMATION JUSTICE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BLOG (July 16, 2008), http://
www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/blog-post/colombian-ngos-file-compulsory-license-request-on-lopinavir
/ritonavir-kaletra.
174. For a discussion of the importance of social determinants, see supra text accompanying note
160. A broader discussion of the developments in other economic and social rights cases is provided in
YOUNG, CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 133–66 (describing case law
developments in the right to housing, health care, water, and in sanitation and electricity protections).
175. Port Elizabeth Municipality v. Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC); Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road
v. City of Johannesburg, 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC); Residents of Joe Slovo Community Western Cape v. Thubelisha
Homes, 2010 (3) SA 454 (CC).
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ing scenarios.176 In some cases, goals of housing and health appear to
conflict. In Olivia Road, for example, the City of Johannesburg made policy
arguments around health in order to expedite the eviction of families from a
housing complex that was argued to be inhabitable. However, the CCSA
chose to balance habitability concerns with the very real danger of home-
lessness, the latter outweighing the former.177
In other cases, goals of housing, sanitation, and health have more clearly
aligned, such as when communities have been protected from evictions
when alternative accommodations were not accessible, or when sanitation
measures have been contested.178 Nonetheless, while these cases indicate
that the social determinants of health have been more litigated than the
right to access health care per se, with a great potential impact on public
health, the CCSA has remained distant from the health dimensions of the
arguments in such cases. In the access to water litigation of 2010, for exam-
ple, the health-related impact of insufficient water was expressly raised on
the papers and dealt with explicitly by the High Court and the Supreme
Court of Appeal but not by the CCSA.179 In litigation involving the access
to toilets and lighting by residents in an informal settlement, the CCSA
chose to defer to the government’s upgrading program under its National
Housing Code, rather than consider the importance of health.180
The three stages of health rights jurisprudence outlined here fall into an
introductory embrace of the reasonableness standard of review, followed by
a greater robustness in the CCSA’s scrutiny of government behavior after
the challenges of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and lastly a continued low-scale
embrace of reasonableness review with greater attention to other socio-eco-
nomic rights outside of the right to access health care. Even the TAC deci-
sion, at the height of the HIV/AIDS crisis, is low-intensity in character,
especially when compared with the rigorous management and large-scale
reforms embarked upon by the CCC in Colombia.181 No other litigation
directly challenging the government’s behavior on the basis of the right to
health care has been brought, although NGOs continue to rely on the right
176. Minister of Pub. Works v. Kyalami Ridge Envtl. Ass’n 2001 (3) SA 1151 (CC).
177. See Olivia Road 1999 (3) SA 208.
178. Nokotyana v. Ekurhuleni Metro. Municipality 2010 (4) BCLR 312 (CC); Mazibuko v. City of
Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC).
179. Mazibuko v. The City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC); City of Johannesburg v. Mazibuko 2009
(3) SA 592 (SCA) and Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg [2008] 4 All SA 471 (W); [2009] ZAGPHC 106
(18 April 2008); Case No. 06/13865, High Court of South Africa (Witswatersrand Local Division).
180. Nokotyana v. Ekurhuleni Metro. Municipality 2010 (4) BCLR 312 (CC); David Bilchitz, Is the
Constitutional Court Wasting Away the Rights of the Poor? Nokotyana v. Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality
127 SALJ. 591 (2010).
181. Members of the CCSA have themselves downgraded the interventionist aspect of TAC. See
Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at [65]: (“The orders made . . . illustrate the Court’s
institutional respect for the policy-making function of the two other arms of government.  The Court
did not seek to draft policy or to determine its content.  Instead, having found that the policy adopted
by government did not meet the required constitutional standard of reasonableness, the Court . . .
required government to revise its policy . . . to remove anomalous restrictions.”).
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to health to publicly criticize or challenge proposed legislation or policy
reforms.182 In the next section, we explore four variables that account for
the differences between the two systems.
IV. FOUR VARIABLES OF JUSTICIABILITY
While Colombia’s justiciable right to health has been formed against a
backdrop of judicially-led criteria, snowballing litigation, litigious inter-
ventions of both insurance companies and patients, and mass demonstra-
tions, South Africa’s tells the tale of provisional justiciability, minimal
litigation, private negotiations in the shadow of litigation, and a more open
defense of other economic and social rights. This comparison weakens
claims about the inevitability of judicial power in right to health com-
plaints. Indeed, the comparative fortunes of the two rights to health have
been remarkably distinct, marked by the very different orientations towards
the intensity of justiciability. We conclude this article by raising four vari-
ables that can explain these distinctions and are worthy of further study,
namely A) legal doctrine, B) the role of the judiciary, C) the institutional
financing of health care, and D) citizen participation.
A. Judicial Doctrine
The CCC and the CCSA have followed vastly different routes for doctri-
nal resolution of the problems of indeterminacy and justiciability, starting
from their framing of the institutional guarantee of the right to health. The
substantively-informed orientation of the CCC lies in contrast to the proce-
durally-informed orientation of the CCSA. In this context, text and inter-
pretation have played a strong role.
In Colombia, the CCC has chosen to entrench a minimum core of the
right to health, linking Colombian jurisprudence with international stan-
dards in order to provide determinacy and perhaps independence to the
definition of the right. The CCC has also sidestepped (or refuted) the mor-
ally difficult question of the rationing of high-cost illness and high-cost
treatments, finding dignity and life to be more salient interests, and refus-
ing to accept the inevitability of rationing decisions. This has led to a
highly moral orientation to the CCC’s defense of people with high-cost
illnesses and its willingness to depart from the POS. This had occurred in
some cases involving the same disease profiles of those in South Africa—
namely, patients living with HIV/AIDS. However, the categorical orienta-
tion of the CCC may have reduced the leverage, or at least the motivation,
for finding other healthcare solutions, such as through negotiation for the
182. See, e.g., Press Statement, Sanac Law and Human Rights Sector Working Group, National
Strategic Plan on HIV and AIDS (2007–2011) A New Opportunity for a Fairer South Africa (May 2,
2007), available at http://www.tac.org.za/content/national-strategic-plan.
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availability of generic medicines that has been successful in the South Afri-
can HIV/AIDS context.
In South Africa, on the other hand, the court has resolutely rejected the
minimum core idea and has instead preferred an approach that assesses the
reasonableness of government conduct, assisted by procedural criteria such
as whether certain interests have been taken into account, or whether cer-
tain groups have been consulted. Of course, more substantive notions of
distributive justice guide the questions of who counts as vulnerable and
whose interests require attention. The CCSA has also placed great stock in
the fact that the right to health is, in the main, protected only according to
the standard of “progressive realization,” requiring only “reasonable” mea-
sures on the part of the state “within its available resources.”183 As with the
standards of obligation recently adopted in international human rights
law,184 this test is consistent with a responsive, almost procedural, orienta-
tion towards economic and social rights. Hence, while economic and social
rights were created to ensure that the legacy of apartheid be addressed, their
main aim has been to create a “culture of justification” for government,185
rather than a substantive, subjective entitlement. The substantive connec-
tion between life and health has not been dwelt upon as a sustainable line of
jurisprudential inquiry. Even dignity, a value prominent in other economic
and social rights cases, has been sidelined in the procedural orientation of
the CCSA’s health decisions.186
Even so, over time, the right to health has gained meaning in explicit
scenarios in South African jurisprudence, such as in relation to the HIV/
AIDs pandemic. In addition, other economic and social rights appear most
robust when claimants raise equality and discrimination concerns, and
when particularly vulnerable groups are claimants.187 It would be a mistake
to see too great a division between South Africa and Colombia in this re-
gard. Nonetheless, it is clear that, in contrast with Colombia, the right to
health cases figure very low in the CCSA’s record, and that its developing
doctrinal content has not given rise to a substantive entitlement.
183. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 27(2). See also S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 36 (general limitations clause,
which applies to the health rights of children).
184. See Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, G.A. Res. 63/117, art. 8(4), U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/117
(Dec. 10, 2008) (adopting the “reasonable” standard of obligation for the new Optional Protocol to the
ICESCR). See generally Brian Griffey, The ‘Reasonableness’ Test: Assessing Violations of State Obligations under
the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 11 HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 275 (2011).
185. Etienne Mureinik, Beyond a Charter of Luxuries: Economic Rights in the Constitution, 8 S. AFR. J.
HUM. RTS. 464, 470–74 (1992).
186. See, e.g., Grootboom 2001 (1) SA at 69 para. 44; Khosa 2004 (6) SA at 539–40 paras. 80–82. For
a discussion of the use of dignity in the minimum core approach, see DAVID BILCHITZ, POVERTY AND
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: THE JUSTIFICATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 146–49
(Oxford Univ. Press, 2007).
187. Khosa 2004 (6) SA 505 (involving both the constitutional guarantee of access to social security
and equality protections).
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B. Judicial Roles
A second variable is the role of judicial review in each jurisdiction. The
conception of judicial review emerges from institutional design and politi-
cal culture, and affects a court’s mode of scrutiny and remedy.188 Extending
an analysis of the different forms of judicial review to local expectations and
institutions is a useful way in which to compare Colombia’s and South Af-
rica’s divergent experiences of justiciability.189
Colombia’s civil law structure, its shared constitutional jurisdiction be-
tween the CCC and other courts, and the availability of tutela claims set in
place a specific trajectory for the right to health.190 Early on, the CCC arro-
gated to the judicial branch responsibility to resolve disputes between pa-
tients and health service providers and insurers, a relationship that has often
been fraught with conflict considering its high stakes.191 By directly order-
ing health sector reform in 2008, the CCC went further and insisted on its
own leadership and indirectly the leadership of courts in inserting the right
to health into the heart of the healthcare system’s design. In the words of
the main author of Decision T-760, the CCC represents “biting substantive
progressiveness” by addressing individual complaints, fixing the content of
rights, redesigning plans, imposing large costs, and ordering regulatory ac-
tion.192 In this sense, the CCC enjoys a strong, perhaps supremacist, role
conception characterized by a managerial orientation in resolving economic
and social rights through judicial review.193 Through delivering structural
remedies, it has sought to take over the dysfunction of the legislative and
administrative branches.194
The CCSA, on the other hand, has taken a more catalytic approach—that
is, one that “opens up the relationship between courts and the elected
188. See generally YOUNG, CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS, supra note 2, chs. 6–7
(introducing an analysis of “role conceptions” to demarcate distinctive styles of the judicial review of
economic and social rights in South Africa, Colombia, India, and the United Kingdom).
189. For a proposal on the inclusion of institutional analysis in comparative constitutionalism, see
MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18–42 (Princeton Univ. Press, 2008) (comparing the forms of
judicial review in New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and Canada to the forms of judicial review
practiced in the United States).
190. See Manuel Jose´ Cepeda-Espinosa, Transcript: Social and Economic Rights and the Colombian Con-
stitutional Court, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1699 (2011) (offering a former justice’s account of developments);
Rodrigo Nunes, Ideational Origins of Progressive Judicial Activism: The Colombian Constitutional Court and
the Right to Health, 52 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y 67 (2010) (seeking to explain the judicial behavior that
has resulted in a judicially-led expansion of welfare benefits).
191. This argument is developed in Diego E. Lo´pez Medina, El derecho fundamental a la salud y el
sistema de salud: los dilemas entre la jurisprudencia, la economı´a y la medicina, in LA PROTECCION JUDICIAL DE
LOS DERECHOS SOCIALES 375–415 (Christian Courtis & Ramiro A´vila Santamarı´a, eds., 2009), http://
www.justicia.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/07/8_Proteccion_judicial.pdf.
192. Cepeda-Espinosa, supra note 190.
193. YOUNG, CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 196–200.
194. See generally David Landau, Political Institutions and Judicial Role in Comparative Constitutional
Law, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 319 (2010) (explaining how the CCC has viewed dysfunctional political
institutions as a license to take on a more activist role).
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branches and lowers the political energy that is required in order to achieve
a rights-protective outcome.”195 While frustrating for individual claimants,
who are often left without a direct remedy, the CCSA’s more tentative ap-
proach to judicial review has led to multidimensional and multi-actor re-
forms.196 South Africa’s court structure, although also sharing
constitutional jurisdiction between the CCSA, Supreme Court of Appeal,
and High Courts, belongs primarily to the common law tradition. Its ac-
cess-to-justice provisions, though generous, contain no parallel to the tutela
action. Health actions are rare, due to cost and access problems. The CCSA’s
early deference probably curbed the enthusiasm for further litigation.197
This has led to an incremental, and partial, protection of the right to
health. The later success of the TAC litigation involved a declaratory rem-
edy,198 and the CCC in particular has been reluctant to involve itself in
mandating and supervising detailed plans for the government to take.199
The relative difficulty in accessing the CCSA has meant that plaintiffs usu-
ally require the support of a public interest organization to proceed. Several
of these organizations—such as the Legal Resources Center, the AIDS Law
Project (now called Section 27), and the Center for Applied Legal Studies—
have been repeat players in constitutional litigation since apartheid.200
Often they accept “test case” complaints with less regard for individual
merits but more regard to the potential for structural impact of the case.201
Soobramoney’s unsupported, and unsuccessful, claim is an example of this
strategy at work in the health care context. This has combined to produce a
195. Katharine G. Young, A Typology of Economic and Social Rights Adjudication: Exploring the Cata-
lytic Function of Judicial Review, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 385, 385 (2010). See also YOUNG, CONSTITUTING
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 172 (developing this characterization further in a
comparative context).
196. YOUNG, CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 172–91.
197. Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, Kwazulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC); see also Alston & Scott,
supra note 121.
198. In Treatment Action Campaign, the CCSA ordered the testing and counseling provisions for the
delivery of the ARV. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA at 33–34 para. 135.
199. In litigation against the Westville Prison, the High Court imposed a supervisory order to
remove restrictions preventing prisoners from accessing ARV treatment, and gave the government two
weeks to lodge an affidavit setting out its plan of compliance. See N v. Gov’t of Republic of S. Afr. & Others
(No 1) 2006 (6) SA 543 (D); N v. Gov’t of Republic of S. Afr. & Others (No 2) 2006 (6) SA 568 (D); N v.
Gov’t of Republic of S. Afr. & Others (No 3) 2006 (6) 575 (D). The failure to comply led to further
litigation, and the remedy facilitated the development of a plan for nationwide provision of ARVs in
prisons. See Cooper, supra note 154, at 196. In other economic and social rights cases, the CCSA has
been prepared to order mandatory remedies, particularly in evictions cases, see, e.g., Olivia Road 1999 (3)
SA 208, or grant suspended declarations of invalidity, see, e.g., Khosa 2004 (6) SA 505. Yet lower courts
have been more ready to do so in South Africa. See Danielle Elyce Hirsch, A Defense of Structural Injunc-
tive Remedies in South African Law, 9 OR. REV. INT’L L. 1, 7–8 (2007).
200. The Legal Resources Center, for example, was founded in 1979 to use law to fight apartheid.
About Us, LEGAL RESOURCES CENTER, http://www.lrc.org.za/about-us (last visited Nov. 7, 2012). It
instructed the lawyers for the TAC litigation and appeared on behalf of the amici in the Grootboom
decision, which was commended by the CCSA. See Grootboom 2001 (1) SA at 30.
201. Cooper, supra note 154, at 193–94.
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very different character than the private, individual focus of Colombia’s
litigation.
C. Financing Backdrop
A third variable to account for differences in right-to-health justiciability
is the healthcare financing backdrop within each jurisdiction. Colombia’s
privatized health insurance scheme, with both contributory and subsidized
regimes of health care, inadvertently created incentives for insurance com-
panies to limit their financial exposure by the strategic use, and support, of
tutela actions. As discussed in Parts II.A and II.C, corruption and the ex-
ploitation of these financing arrangements further distorted the costs of this
healthcare system.
In South Africa, it is the public health system that has been targeted in
health rights litigation, although the meagerness of its budget and the sup-
port of rationing have meant that litigation is unlikely to result in greater
access to public health care. While private companies have been held ac-
countable for the right to health—usually in the mobilizations against
pharmaceutical companies—their actions against government have usually
been settled on the basis of public protest,202 rather than in court.
Unlike Colombia, South Africa contains no provision for universal insur-
ance coverage. Nonetheless, there are measures in place to reform the sys-
tem of healthcare financing into a National Health Insurance scheme.203
This process, which will be phased in over a period of 14 years, will provide
coverage to the whole population and attempt to minimize individual bur-
dens of payment. Individuals will contribute according to their ability to
pay, and pooled payments will then be used to fund benefits in line with
each individual’s need for care. Cross-subsidization will thus be estab-
lished.204 Under present proposals, both public and private providers will
deliver health care.205 The government views the reforms as consistent with
the constitutional right to access health care because they implement the
principles “that access to health services must be free at the point of use and
that people will benefit according to their health profile.”206 Such reforms
may signal a different trajectory for South Africa’s right of access to health
care in the future, and perhaps a greater potential convergence with Colom-
bia’s model, insofar as private providers may be incentivized to litigate and
insofar as the new system may create new opportunities for profit-seeking
that are difficult to regulate.
202. Young, supra note 153.
203. See Dep’t of Health, NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA: POLICY PAPER (Aug.
11, 2011).
204. Id.
205. Id. The contractual arrangements with private providers remain vague. See id. at paras. 85–86.
Accreditation standards will determine the minimum range of services to be provided. Id. at para. 100.
A National Health Insurance Fund will administer the costs of health care. See id. at para. 132.
206. Id. at para. 52(a).
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D. Civil Society
Finally, both systems have different configurations of civil society. A
consciousness of the importance of the right to health is common in each.
In both Colombia and South Africa, the right to health was entrenched in a
new Bill of Rights, and accompanied great expectations of social, political,
and legal change. In Colombia, the vision of universal health care, while
persistently unrealized, remained an important legacy of social-liberalism of
the 1930s, as well as part of progressive aspirations of social justice. In
South Africa, the experience of health and ill health was explicitly linked to
the historic racism of apartheid, which had defeated earlier attempts to pro-
vide free health care for all.207
Nowadays, civil society participation includes professionals, such as doc-
tors and nurses, who have been hugely invested in the right to health as
supportive of their professional autonomy and professional ethics. Mobiliza-
tions also include patients’ movements in both countries, and the mobiliza-
tion of patients living with HIV/AIDS occurred at an early stage in each.
Nonetheless, active patients’ groups in Colombia have mobilized around
high-cost diseases and have usually reflected the middle class litigating for
its own interest, sometimes with the support of pharmaceutical companies.
These patient and professional groups have targeted the government as the
appropriate provider of quality health care. At least in 2010, their cause
garnered massive popular support. In South Africa, the depth and intensity
of the HIV/AIDS response, by movements such as the TAC, as well as the
history of an anti-apartheid repertoire of protest, has created a different de-
gree of social movement activity centered on access to medicines and the
state’s duty to regulate, rather than merely provide, health care. Such move-
ments have targeted pharmaceutical companies, often shoring up the state
in its attempts to regulate the industry. Their use of litigation is strategic
and minimal. This, combined with and itself influenced by factors of fi-
nancing and doctrine, has led to a very different path for the right to health.
V. CONCLUSION
The right to health is highly contingent on background judicial and le-
gal structures. The debates for and against its constitutional entrenchment,
ratification, or domestic implementation should proceed with an under-
standing that, while text may count, institutional configurations are most
at issue. The Colombian experience of high-intensity justiciability within
its civil law system has led to substantive interpretations of the core of the
207. The South African National Health Service Commission of 1942–1944 (led by Dr. Henry
Gluckman) pioneered a proposal for a National Health Tax, which would ensure that health services
could be provided free at the point of service for all South Africans. Progress to implement this proposal
was reversed with the election of the National Party in 1948 and the institution of apartheid. For a
description of this Commission, see Dep’t of Health, supra note 203, paras. 41–42.
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right to health; numerous tutela actions; and both individual and structural,
supervised remedies. The South African experience of low-intensity jus-
ticiability is demonstrated by the use of a procedurally-focused, common
law style reasonableness review; largely declaratory remedies; and the persis-
tence of health petitions and negotiations outside of the courts. Jus-
ticiability is affected by the variables of what we term legal doctrine,
judicial roles, healthcare provision and financing schemes, and civil society
participation in each country. Attention to these parameters helps to
ground and inform the arguments for and against a justiciable right to
health.
